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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 45 MARCH 1971 NUMBER 3
IMPROVING NEW YORK'S NEW CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE LAW
FREuCK J. LUDWIG*
Law is a means to an end. Ordinarily, the measure of any proce-
dural rule is how well it attains the ends of the substantive law it is
designed to implement. In a general sense, any one of the more than
400 separate sections contained in the new Criminal Procedure Law1
of New York (CPL) is good or bad to the extent that the provision
serves or disserves the ends of the substantive Penal Law2 of the state.
The primary end of the substantive Penal Law is to advance the com-
mon good by preventing crime. Its provisions propose to give fair warn-
ing in advance by drawing the line between lawful and criminal
conduct and pointing out the consequences of overstepping that line.
When its written text is administered, the criminal law affects human
behavior only by the manner in which it impinges upon each person
accused of crime. This influence makes itself felt by (1) subjecting ac-
tual offenders to unpleasant treatment in the hope (often in vain) that
its memory will intimidate them from offending again; (2) treating
actual offenders so that potential ones will be dissuaded by that exam-
ple; (3) restraining those dangerously likely to commit crimes; and (4)
rehabilitating corrigible offenders.
CRITERIA FOR PROCEDURAL RULES
The test of "means-end" between procedural rules and the sub-
stantive law that they implement may suffice to evaluate procedural
rules in civil and administrative law. Additional scales of value must
be invoked for criminal procedure. This is so because success or failure
in criminal law administration largely depends on the state of mind of
* Chief Assistant District Attorney, Queens County, New York. A.B., College of City of
New York, 1939; M.S. in Ed., id., 1942; LL.B., Columbia University, 1945 [Juris Doctor,
1969].
I Law of May 20, 1970, chs. 996, 997, [1970] N.Y. Laws 2147, N.Y. CPL (McKinney
1970) (effective Sept. 1, 1971) [hereinafter N.Y. CPL].
2 N.Y. PENAL LAW (McKinney 1967).
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actual and potential offenders- the entire community-in striving
to attain an atmosphere of law and order. A criminal law system that
achieves maximum deterrent efficacy operates to induce people to main-
tain their own self-restraint and refrain from lawless conduct. But the
same deterrent effect on potential offenders might be achieved if a
hundred murders were disposed of by convicting a hundred innocent
defendants. The baronet's cousin in Dickens's novel, who, perplexed
by the failure of the police to discover the murderer of the baronet's
solicitor, said "Far better hang wrong fellow than no fellow," expressed
the danger of any criterion of a rule of criminal procedure that is lim-
ited solely to preventing crime-the end of the substantive law of
crime. The first test of any rule of procedure in administering the law
of crime is that it operates directly to acquit the innocent and convict
the guilty.3
Second, a worthwhile rule of criminal procedure must be certain
in its application. It must be designed and implemented to apply to all
persons who commit crime, and not on occasions to a few. It has taken
many centuries of brutal experience to demonstrate that certainty of
punishment is more effective in preventing crime than severity. During
the reign of Henry VIII, 72,000 persons were executed for robbery and
theft alone. This was an average of 2,000 per year in a population con-
siderably less than three million.4 Even as late as 1819 in England, the
death penalty was available for no fewer than 220 offenses. 5 Proposed
reforms met with vigorous opposition. When in 1814 a man was ex-
ecuted for cutting down a cherry tree, the judge observed that anyone
who would maliciously cut down a tree would kill a man.6 When it
was proposed to abolish the death penalty for stealing five shillings
from a dwelling house, the Lord Chancellor and the Chancellor of the
Exchequer expressed profound regret. Even Sir Robert Peel consid-
ered this "a most dangerous experiment." And Lord Ellenborough,
Chief Justice of the King's Bench, warned: "If we suffer this Bill to
pass, we shall not know where we stand - we shall not know whether
we are upon our heads or our feet." 7 It was emphasized that severity of
punishment was the single most important threat to the potential of-
fender. Yet even at public executions, at a time when picking pockets
3 Rules that exclude trustworthy evidence of guilt on the basis of procedural due
process (see Rochin v. California, 342 US. 165 (1952)), or unreasonable search and seizure
(see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)), must find justification on grounds other than
acquittal of the innocent and conviction of the guilty.
4 REPORT OF SELEc'r COMM. ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT Vii (H.M. Stationery Office 1930).
5Id.
6id. xii.
7 Id.
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was punishable by death, pickpockets plied their trade among the crowd
gazing upward at the hangman's noose, "for they accounted executions
their best harvest." The argument of Sir Samuel Romilly in the House
of Commons that certainty, and not severity, of punishment was the
important ingredient in deterrence, finally succeeded in abolition of
brutal punishment for petty crime, only because the establishment of
a police force in London in 1829 made that certainty a concrete reality.8
Third, without sacrificing either its primary purpose of acquitting
the innocent and convicting the guilty or the certainty of its applica-
tion, a good procedural rule must be capable of celerity in practice. The
huge investment of community resources in court, correction, police,
probation and prosecution is based upon the faith that subjecting ac-
tual offenders to some sort of compulsory treatment will deter would-be
offenders. In this manner, prosecution should prevent crime in the long
run. The first article of this faith is that there be a reasonable length
of time between the arrest of an alleged offender and the disposition
of his case. When the time between arrest and disposition becomes tire-
some months and years, deterrence of potential offenders is nullified.
Prevention of crime ceases to be an outcome of prosecution. Crime
rates continue to spiral, even though assistant district attorneys appear
and report that they are ready in court rooms every day.
Finally, a good procedural rule must have the appearance as well
as the reality of being good. "The first requirement of a sound body of
law is that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands
of the community, whether right or wrong."9 Trial by jury, now re-
quired in all criminal causes involving possible maximum penalties
exceeding six months,10 did not spring full-grown, like the Boticellian
Aphrodite, from the Magna Carta's guarantee to the noblemen of the
"judgment of his peers" in a trial at the King's suit in the House of
Lords. For the less favored multitude, the institution had to win its
spurs in sharp competition with trials by ordeal and oath, and was to
assume its current shape only after centuries of development. Reflection
upon alternate methods of resolving disputed issues of fact indicates
why trial by jury emerged as most popular. Ordeal by fire involved the
accused's taking in hand a piece of red-hot iron, or his walking bare-
foot and blindfolded over nine red-hot ploughshares laid lengthwise
at unequal distances. If the party escaped unhurt, he was adjudged in-
nocent; but if it happened otherwise, "as without collusion it usually
8 Id.
9 O.W. HoLms, THE COMMON LAw 41 (1881).
10 Baldwin v. New York, 399 US. 66 (1970).
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did," he was then condemned as guilty." In water-ordeal, the defen-
dant was required to plunge his bare arm elbow-deep in boiling water
without being scalded to establish his innocence. Alternatively, the
accused was tossed into a pond of cold water, and acquittal, a question-
able victory indeed, could be attained only by sinking.' 2 In the bilateral
ordeal by battle, which survived abolition until 1819, the accused es-
capsed conviction by avoiding decapitation in day-long judicial combat
with double-edged Frankish war axes.'3 In the thirteenth and four-
teenth century city of London, a defendant accused of homicide might
purge himself by swearing six times, each oath backed by six oath-
helpers so that, in all, thirty-seven persons swore. Such wager of law at
Westiminster was early debased by the emergence of a union of com-
purgators who swore for their living.'4 When, at last, the accused was
given the election of putting himself upon the country, the jury, as
neighborhood witnesses of the crime, continued for hundreds of years
to be the source of proof as much as the arbiters of such proof. One by
one with the passing centuries, the ancient ordeals by fire, by water
and by battle, and trial by compurgation have been abandoned. In the
course of centuries, they have ceased to command the confidence of the
community as sound methods of resolving disputed issues of fact.
SOURCE OF STATE PROCEDURAL RULES
The new Criminal Procedure Law by no means embraces all of
the statutory rules governing criminal procedure in New York.' 5 Many
significant provisions are contained in non-statutory rules formulated
by various judicial bodies.' The most fundamental are those derived
114 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARMS *337. But cf. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENcLISH LAW 599 (2d ed. 1899): "Such evidence as we have seems to show
that the ordeal of hot iron was so arranged as to give the accused a considerable chance
of escape."
12 Id.
13 See 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *337-41; 4 id. 0340-42.
14 See 3 id. 0343.
15 See, e.g., the rule of the law of evidence requiring corroboration, dealt with in
N.Y. CPL §§ 60.20(3) (unsworn evidence of child less than twelve), 60.22 (accomplice),
60.50 (confession of defendant); see also § 70.10(1). A similar rule of corroboration also
appears in a half-dozen instances in the penal law. N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 115.51 (for
criminal facilitation), 130.15 (for rape, sodomy, sexual misconduct and sexual abuse),
165.65(1) (criminal possession of stolen property), 210.50 (perjury and related offenses),
230.35 (promoting prostitution), 255.30 (adultery and incest). Other state statutes contain
various provisions of criminal procedure, e.g., Agriculture & Markets Law, CPLR, Civil
Rights Law, Correction Law, Executive Law, General Construction Law, General Munic-
ipal Law, Judiciary Law, Labor Law, N.Y.C. Criminal Court Act, District Court Act,
Uniform Justice Court Act, and Vehicle & Traffic Law.
a6 See, e.g., N. Y. COURT Ru as (McKinney 1970): Court of Appeals § 500.8 (papers
in criminal matters); Appellate Division, First Dep't §§ 600.8 (appeals in criminal cases),
603.11, 606.5 (assigned counsel in criminal cases); Supreme Court, New York and Bronx
[Vol. 45:387
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from the Constitution of the United States. These are beyond the pale
of state reformulation - by statute or judicial action - and can be
modified only by amendment to the federal constitution or reinterpre-
tation by the Supreme Court.
Only nine provisions of the original text of the constitution
adopted in 1789 dealt directly with criminal law administration. Three
provisions concerned treason, two of them substantive rules defining
treason and providing for its punishment, and one procedural relating
to the quantum of proof for conviction. 17 Three more provisions dealt
with suspension of the writ of habeas corpus' 8 and prohibitions on leg-
islative passage of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.'9 All of
these half-dozen provisions concerned the central government and not
the states, and have remained the exclusive province of federal court
adjudication. An additional three provisions involved the states: two
concerning prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws,
also forbidden to Congress,20 and one relating to interstate rendition.21
The first session of the first Congress in 1789 proposed twelve
amendments to the people of the states, and ten of these were ratified
in 1791. This was in fulfillment of the understanding upon which a
number of the original thirteen state conventions ratified the original
document in 1788, particularly Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania
and Virginia. The Bill of Rights which these amendments comprise
enumerates no fewer than a score of separately identifiable guarantees.
Sixteen, or 80 percent of these, have significance in criminal law ad-
ministration.22 The remaining three apparently do not.23
As a matter of explicit language, only the first amendment refers
to the governmental body being restricted, viz., Congress. The remain-
ing amendments in the Bill of Rights are silent on the sovereignty sub-
Counties §§ 661.1-661.6 (criminal actions and proceedings); Appellate Division, Second
Dep't §§ 671.1-671.8 (duties of counsel in criminal actions, coram nobis and habeas corpus);
Supreme Court, Kings County §§ 751.1-751.81 (criminal actions and proceedings); Su-
preme Court, Richmond County §§ 755.20-755.27 (criminal actions and proceedings);
Supreme Court, Queens County §§ 796.1-796.8 (criminal actions and proceedings); Criminal
Court of the City of New York §§ 2950.1-2950.17 (rules); Family Court §§ 2506.1-2506.7
(juvenile delinquents).
17 U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 3.
18 Id. art. I, § 9, d. 2.
19 Id. art. I, § 9, d. 3.
20 Id. art. I, § 10.
21 d. art. IV, § 2, c. 2.
22 See Tables I, H & III infra.
23 These are the third amendment's restriction on quartering soldiers, the seventh
amendment's right to trial by jury in civil suits where the value in controversy exceeds
twenty dollars and, finally, the tenth amendment "truism" that undelegated powers are
reserved to the states or people.
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ject to limitation. Thus, a municipal restriction making criminal the
holding of funeral services in Catholic churches was early held to be
outside the ambit of the first amendment.24 But previously in Barron
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 25 it was settled by judicial construction that
the first eight amendments were directed only at the federal govern-
ment. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants had, in contravention
of the fifth amendment, taken his property for public use without just
compensation. Chief Justice Marshall, in denying the applicability of
the amendment, said that
[the] Fifth Amendment must be understood as restraining the
power of the general government, not as applicable to the states ....
In almost every convention by which the constitution was adopted,
amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recom-
mended. These amendments demanded security against the ap-
prehended encroachments of the general government- not against
those of the local governments .... These amendments contain no
expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state gov-
ernments. This court cannot so apply them.26
For the first eighty years, the sixteen provisions contained in the
Bill of Rights - all affecting criminal law administration- were of
no concern in state or local criminal proceedings. The sovereignty
against which these guarantees applied was exclusively the federal
government. However, in 1868, the fourteenth amendment was adopted.
The first and last of its five sections have the most direct and current
significance for state criminal law administration. Section 1 denies any
state power to
[m]ake or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States [defined as persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof]; deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; [and]
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
Section 5 provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
Except for the clause prohibiting denial to any person of the equal
protection of the laws,27 the remaining provisions in the first section of
the fourteenth amendment had no significance for state criminal law
24 Pemoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).
25 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
26 Id. at 247, 250.
27 See, e.g., Rogers v. Alabama, 192 US. 226 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 US. 442
[Vol. 45:387
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administration for the first fifty-five years of its existence.28 In 1923, in
the landmark decision of Meyer v. Nebraska,29 the Supreme Court for
the first time in the more than half-century existence of the fourteenth
amendment, invoked its due process clause to reverse a state criminal
conviction. In doing so, the Court made applicable to the states the
freedom of opinion guarantees contained in the first amendment for
the first time in the 132 year history of that amendment.30 In the thir-
ties, five first-impression decisions made additional Bill of Rights pro-
visions applicable to state criminal proceedings. In the forties, there
were three more such decisions, in the fifties only one, with the decade
record of seven in the sixties. Table I lists these cases; Table II con-
siders two Bill of Rights provisions still held not applicable to the
states; and Table III considers four other provisions possibly in the
embryonic stage of applicability.
This review of the impact of the Bill of Rights on state criminal
proceedings does not subsume the equal or greater impact of applica-
tion of Supreme Court standards to state prosecutions in the name of
the due process clause in the fourteenth amendment considered purely
in a procedural sense, i.e., adequate notice, fair trial, impartial tribu-
nal.31 Nor are significant extensions of provisions of the Bill of Rights
that have been made applicable to the states considered.32 The entry of
(1900); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880);
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
28Several Bill of Rights provisions invoked under the due process and privileges
and immunities clauses in criminal cases were held inapplicable to the states during
this fifty-year period. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (privilege against
self-incrimination); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (trial by jury); In re Kemmler,
136 U.S. 436 (1890) (cruel and inhuman punishment); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252
(1886) (freedom of assembly); Hurtado v. California, 110 US. 516 (1884) (right to indict-
ment by grand jury); United States v. Craikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (freedom of assembly).
29 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), decided the
same day.
3o Only a year before the Meyer decision, the Court said that "Neither the Four-
teenth Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution of the United States
imposes upon the States any restrictions about 'freedom of speech' or the 'liberty of
silence.'" Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922).
31 E.g., Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968) (Bruton rule requiring separate trials
of co-defendants when one confesses applied to states); Gilbert v. California, 388 US.
263 (1967) (fair in-court and pre-trial line up identifications); Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S.
235 (1949) (necessity of state post-trial corrective judicial process to vindicate federal
rights); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (vagueness of statute); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (conviction based upon evidence consisting of coerced
confession); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 US. 103 (1935) (suppression by prosecution at trial
of exculpatory evidence); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (trial before judge without
pecuniary interest in outcome); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 85 (1923) (requiring trial
free from mob domination); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 US. 578 (1897) (due process
limiting state legislative jurisdiction).
32E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436 (1966) (extension of fifth amendment self-
1971]
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TABLE I
INITIAL APPLICATION OF GuARANTEEs IN BILL OF RIGHTS TO STATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
U.S. Const.
Amendment Guarantee Initially Held Applicable
I No law respecting an establish-
ment of religion
Prohibiting free exercise of reli-
gion
Abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press
Peaceably to assemble, and to pe-
tition the Government
IV Against unreasonable searches
and seizures
V Subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb
Compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself
Nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due proc-
ess of law
VI Speedy trial
Public trial
Jury of state and district wherein
the crime was committed
To be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him
To have the assistance of counsel
for his defense
IX Enumeration of certain rights
not to be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by
the people
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67
(1953)
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940)
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 859
(1931); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931)
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941); Hague v. C.I.O., 807 U.S. 496
(1989)
Wolf v. Colorado, 388 U.S. 25 (1949);
Mapp v. Ohio, 867 U.S. 643 (1961)
Benton v. Maryland, 895 U.S. 784 (1969)
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
XIV Amendment (so restricting any
state)
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 886 U.S. 213
(1967)
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)
Duncan v. Louisiana, 891 U.S. 145
(1968)
Pointer v. Texas, 880 U.S. 400 (1965)
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1982)
Griswold v. Connecticut, 881 U.S. 479
(1965)
TABLE II
GuARANTEs HELD NOT APPLICABLE TO STATES
U.S. Const.
Amendment Guarantee Held Not Applicable
II To keep and bear arms Presser v. Illinois, 116 US. 252 (1886)
V Hold to answer for a capital, or Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
otherwise infamous crime, un- (1884)
less on a presentment or in-
dictment of a grand jury
[Vol. 45:387
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TABLE I
GuARANTEEs NOT SQUARELY HELD APPLICABLE TO STATES
U.S. Const.
Amendment Guarantee Present Status
VI To have compulsory process Power to review state denial assumed (but
for obtaining witnesses in not held) in 2d, 5th and 10th Circuits
his favor
VIII Excessive bail shall not be re- Power to review state court denial or grant
quired of high bail assumed (but not held) on
habeas corpus for incarcerated defend-
ants in the 2d, 4th, 5th and 8th Circuits
No excessive fines to be im- Power assumed (but not held) to interfere
posed with XIV Amendment due process;
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 US.
86 (1909)
Nor cruel and unusual pun- Assumed (but not held): Louisiana ex rel.
ishments inflicted Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947);
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962)
See also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436
(1890); Rochin v. California, 342 US.
165 (1952)
the Constitution of the United States into state and local criminal law
administration during the past forty-eight years has certainly circum-
scribed the power of any state to act through its legislature in prescrib-
ing rules of criminal procedure. These decisions- based on the
Constitution - are the Supreme Law. They cannot be modified in any
manner by any state legislative body. Any change requires either con-
stitutional amendment 3s or the overruling of a prior holding -either
implicitly or explicitly -by the Supreme Court. One consequence of
attempting to restate these rules of the Court in a legislative code en-
acted by a state is to require further state action before any modifica-
tion made by the Court can validly take effect in such state.a4
Until recently it had generally been assumed that constitutional
rules of criminal procedure expounded by the Supreme Court cut one
way in favor of the defendant and his rights so as to function as mini-
mum standards for the states. In this view, states were free to adopt
additional protections for the accused, even in areas within the Bill
incrimination and sixth amendment right to counsel provisions to require affirmative
warnings for police custody interrogation).
B3E.g., Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 US. 429 (1895), overruled, U.S.
CoNsr. amend. XVI; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 US. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), overruled, U.S.
CONST. amend. XI.
B4 More than half of the state legislatures (twenty-eight) meet regularly only every
second year to consider matters such as criminal procedure. CoUcNIL oF STATE GOvERN-
mrmNrs, THE BooK oF THE STATES - 1970-1971, 66-67 (1970).
1971]
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of Rights and fourteenth amendment due process. But, in California
v. Green,35 the Court made clear that its pronouncements are a double-
edged sword that protect the prosecution as well as the accused. In that
case, a state statute authorized admissibility at a hearing of evidence of
a prior inconsistent statement by a witness even if such evidence was
hearsay. The highest state court held the statute violated a defendant's
sixth amendment right to confrontation. The Supreme Court reversed,
vacated the judgment and remanded the case.
MAJOR CHANGES IN NEw LAW
Like Caesar's Gaul, all of the new Criminal Procedure Law is
divided into three Parts: Part One - General Provisions - subdivided
into four Titles, A through D; Part Two - The Principal Proceedings
- containing six Titles, H through M; Part Three - Special Pro-
ceedings and Miscellaneous Procedures - consisting of subordinate
Titles P through U.386 The Titles are further subdivided into Articles.
These are designated by numerals spaced by tens so that Part One
contains Articles 1, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 and 70;37 Part Two contains
Articles 100-470; 38 and Part Three contains Articles 500-730. Each
Article is subdivided into Sections. The order in which these provisions
will be reviewed is the chronological one in which a criminal case
proceeds, and not the order employed in the Criminal Procedure Law.39
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
The CPL undertakes a restatement of the case law on state criminal
jurisdiction. Its codified provisions are brand new and not comparable
to anything in the old Code which was silent on the subject.40 Existing
case law concerns itself with (a) the basis of jurisdiction, and (b) the
situs of the crime. A third area -venue - was covered in the old
Code.
Basis of Jurisdiction
Suppose D, a Frenchman, murders X, an Englishman, in Brooklyn.
May D's case lawfully be disposed of in the courts of (1) the State of
New York? (2) France? (3) England? (4) Mexico?
Territoriality, the basic Anglo-American theory of jurisdiction
35399 U.S. 149 (1970).
S6 There are no Titles E, F, G, N, 0, X, Y, or Z.
37 There are no Articles 80-100.
38 There are no Articles 480-490.
39 See, e.g., F. LunwiG, CASES ON CRIBMNAL PROCEDURE (1951).
40 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. (McKinney 1958) [hereinafter N.Y. CCP].
[Vol. 45:387
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that makes place of commission determinative of jurisdiction dearly
indicates "(1)" as the proper forum.41
Nationality, or the Roman theory derived from pater familias and
based on the concept of criminal justice as discipline of the tribe or clan,
makes "(2)" the answer for the considerable number of nations with
systems of law derived from Rome. These countries readily punish
foreigners committing crimes within their borders in order to maintain
the "peace of the King"-the basis of common-law criminal jurisdiction
- but they do so incidentally and secondarily to the basic motif of
consanguineal good behavior. Just as civil-law nations recognize ter-
ritoriality as a supplementary basis, common-law countries also recog-
nize nationality or citizenship as a basis of jurisdiction, provided it is
based upon a statute.42 State citizenship has been recognized as a basis
of criminal jurisdiction, provided it is claimed by state statute.43
A third basis, jurisdiction of the injured forum, would make "(3)"
correct. When a Frenchman who forged German securities in Switzer-
land was punished in Germany, the exercise of jurisdiction was accepted
as a matter of course outside the United States and British Common-
wealth. Under this theory, jurisdiction is determined by the injury
caused by the offense. State criminal jurisdiction may be exercised on
this basis provided it is claimed by statute and the injury may be
established as a result of the offense committed outside a state's
41 Extraterritorial jurisdiction is also part of the common-law theory of territoriality.
Originally, the person of the sovereign while abroad was deemed to be at home for
purposes of criminal jurisdiction. The fiction has been extended to the sovereign's am-
bassadors and soldiers, and vessels and airplanes under its flag. See United States v. Bow-
man, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).4 2E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1964) (providing punishment for treason committed abroad
by American nationals); see Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (contempt of
federal court by American national abroad under statute); Regina v. Azzopardi, 174
Eng. Rep. 776 (1843) (under statute authorizing trial of subject in England for homicide
committed on land outside the United Kingdom "whether without the King's dominions
or not," native of Malta found guilty of homicide in Smyrna, "without" the King's
dominions).
43The American Law Institute, while recognizing nationality as a basis of juris-
diction for the federal government as a "nation recognized as such by the law of nations"
provided such basis is claimed by statute, rejects individual state citizenship for this
purpose. RESTATmENT OF CONFLIr oF LAws §§ 425, 426 (1934). In Skiriotes v. Florida,
313 U.S. 69 (1941), the Court affirmed a conviction under a state statute making criminal
the use of diving suits to take commercial sponges in the Gulf of Mexico off the
Florida coast in a case in which the forbidden apparatus was used beyond the three-
mile limit of the international boundaries of the United States. Mexico had no statute
on the question. The Court said that "[i]f the United States may control the conduct
of its citizens upon the high seas, we see no reason why the State of Florida may not
likewise govern the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas with respect to matters
in which the State has a legitimate interest and where there is no conflict with an act
of Congress." Id. at 77. For validity of "absent voters" statute punishing conduct com-
mitted outside the state by its citizens, see State ex rel. Chandier v. Main, 16 Wis. 398
(1863).
1971]
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borders." Thus, a state may provide by statute for trial and punishment
of homicide if the victim dies within its borders even though the fatal
blow was rendered outside its borders and the killer had nothing to do
with causing the victim to be within them at the time of death.
Finally, under a fourth basis - the cosmopolitan theory of jurisdic-
tion, any nation or state has power to punish any crime committed any-
where by anyone. This theory could make "(4)" a correct answer, or,
indeed any nation from Afghanistan to Zambia. It has met with limited
acceptance in Italy, and has been used elsewhere in cases of piracy
beyond the injured forum theory.
The CPL accepts two of these four bases of jurisdiction, i.e.,
territoriality and injured forum, and omits any statutory claim to
citizenship as a basis," or any reference to the cosmopolitan theory.
Under the injured forum theory, statutory claim to jurisdiction is made
when the "result of the offense" is also an element and occurs within
the state.46 A presumption is added that in a homicide the victim died
within the state if his body is found here.47 Even if the result is not an
element of the offense, when conduct constituting the offense occurs
wholly outside the state, claim is still made to jurisdiction if the "par-
ticular effect" of the conduct has a materially harmful impact on govern-
ment or community welfare in this state, or defrauds persons here.4"
In such non-element particular effect situations, jurisdiction is limited
to cases in which a statute defining the offense is designed to prevent
the particular effect and the defendant intended that effect,49 but the
conduct need not be made criminal in the place of commission.50
Inchoate crimes aimed at the state, such as attempt committed else-
4 4RRFSrATEmEN OF CoNtracr OF LAws § 428, comment b (1934); see Hanks v. State,
13 Tex. App. 289 (1882) (Texas may punish a nonresident who, outside the state, forges
a transfer of a Texas land certificate).
45 Cf. N.Y. CCP § 133: "A person who leaves this state, with intent to elude any law
thereof against duelling or prize-fighting, or challenges thereto, or to do any act for-
bidden by such a law, or, who being a resident of this state, does an act out of it, which
would be punishable as a violation of such a law, may be indicted and tried in any county
of this state."
46 N.Y. CPL §§ 20.10(3), 20.20(2)(a).
47Id. § 20.20(2)(a); cf. Law of Mar. 12, 1909, ch. 88, § 1933, [1909] N.Y. Laws 132
(repealed 1967) [hereinafter Old N.Y. Penal Law]: "A person who commits an act without
this state which affects persons or property within this state, or the public health, morals,
or decency of this state, and which, if committed within this state, would be a crime,
is punishable as if the act were committed within this state."
48 N.Y. CPL § 20.10(4); ci. Old N.Y. Penal Law § 1930(5): "A person who, being out
of the state and with intent to cause within it a result contrary to the laws of this state
does an act which in its natural and usual course results in an act or effect contrary to
its laws."
49 N.Y. CPL § 20.20(2)(b).
6O Id. § 20.30(2).
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where5l and conspiracy provided an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy occurred within the state,52 are made subject to the jurisdic-
tion of New York. In addition, omission to perform a duty imposed by
the laws of this state is punishable even if the offender is outside its
borders.5 3
Situs of the crime
For the basis of territoriality, when conduct constituting an offense
occurs outside the state, determining place of commission is crucial. D,
standing in New Jersey, shoots across the river and kills X in New York.
May D lawfully be tried in New Jersey, New York, or either state? Sup-
pose, further, that X upon being wounded was taken to a hospital in
Connecticut where he died. At common law, the rule might have de-
veloped that any of the states in which elements of the offense occurred
would have jurisdiction. But for some reason, a single state was insisted
upon: in the absence of statute, the state in which the fatal force im-
pinged upon the body of the victim, or New York, in the supposed
case.54
If in the supposed case, D had missed, the common-law rule, by a
fiction that the shooter constructively follows his bullet, would make D
triable for the attempt only in the state into which he fired.5  Only in
the case of larceny, was the common-law insistence on a single state
relaxed so that the thief who stole chattels in one state and brought
them to another could be tried in either state. 6
The CPL subjects offenses consummated elsewhere to jurisdiction
of the New York courts if inchoate conduct occurred within the state
sufficient to establish an element of the offense, an attempt to commit
the offense, or conspiracy or solicitation to commit it.z7 In such cases,
the place of consummation must make the conduct criminal.58 Under
the old Code, it had been held that the state lacked jurisdiction "unless
the act within this state is so related to the crime that, if nothing more
had followed, it would amount to an attempt."; 9 The CPL has over-
5ld. § 20.20(2)(c).
521d. § 2020(2)(d).
53 Id. § 20.20(3).
54State v. Hall, 114 N.C. 909, 19 S.E. 602 (1894) (facts same as in supposed case);
see also People v. Botin, 132 Cal. 231, 64 P. 286 (1901) (D mailed poisoned chocolates
from California to X in Delaware); REsrATEmNT oF CoNTucr oFr Liws § 428, comment
a (1934).
55 Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 17 S.E. 984 (1893).
56 State v. Bennett, 14 Iowa 479 (1863).
5t N.Y. CPL § 20.20(l).
58Id. § 20.30(1).
59 People v. Werblow, 241 N.Y. 55, 61, 148 N.E. 786, 789 (1925).
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ruled this case by the addition of an element of the offense, consipracy
and solicitation.
Finally, in connection with the territorial perimeter of a state
bounded by the sea, the common-law rule prescribed a limit of one
marine league - three and one-half miles or a cannon shot.60 The old
Code modified this perimeter to "a line two nautical miles distant from
the shore at high water mark.""'- The CPL drops this claim, adopts as
"its boundaries" those "prescribed in the state law" which may now
mean three and one-half miles.62
Venue
Jurisdiction means the power of a sovereign, in this case a state,
to act in a criminal proceeding, whether through its executive branch,
e.g., by demand or refusal of interstate rendition or international ex-
tradition, its legislature, e.g., by enacting a statute purporting to govern
conduct that occurs inside or outside its boundaries, or its judiciary,
e.g., by entering judgment purely for or against a defendant. Venue
relates to judicial power distributed among courts within a state.
The power of a state to act in a federal union, connoted by state
jurisdiction, is subject to federal constitutional limitations of due pro-
cess considered in a territorial-jurisdictional sense. Venue - a purely
intrastate and local judicial factor- is not so limited. For some un-
stated reason, jurisdiction is used by the CPL synonymously to desig-
nate both the three-branch totality of state power and the local judicial
exercise of power within a state.63
The CPL restates for venue (called "jurisdiction of counties")
virtually identical claims made for state jurisdiction.64 There are two
minor modifications. One would shrink county venue vis-h-vis state
jurisdiction by omission of criminal solicitation as an event occurring
within a county sufficient to try.65 The other expands venue compared
with jurisdiction by conferring it outright in homicide cases upon the
finding in a county of a body or its part, rather than merely creating a
presumption that death occurred where such finding was made within
the state.66
Practically all of the old Code provisions on venue for offenses
60 Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122 (1923).
61 N.Y. CCP § li-a. A nautical mile is one-sixtieth of a degree at the equator, or
6,080 feet.
62 N.Y. CPL § 20.40(4)(i).
63 See id. art. 20.
64 Compare id. § 20.20(1), (2). (3) with id. § 20.40(1)2 (2), (3).
65 Compare id. § 20.20(1)(c) with id. § 20.40(1)(b).
66 Compare id. § 20.20(2)(a) with id. § 20.40(2)(b).
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committed on boundaries, vessels and common carriers, bridges and
tunnels and waters contiguous to New York City,67 are continued in the
CPL.6s Expanded venue provisions are made for child abandonment, 9
bigamy,70 and crimes committed in private vehicles.71 The CPL does
not explicitly contain provisions of former statutes that conferred both
jurisdiction and venue to punish for larceny a theft committed outside
the state when the thief brings the stolen goods into the state,72 or to
punish for abduction or kidnapping the out-of-state defendant who
sends his victim into the state.73
OTHER PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Time Limitations
Since the King could do no wrong, it was impossible at common
law that delay in pressing any claim of the Crown, civil or criminal,
could be raised by a defendant, even if all his witnesses might have died,
disappeared or forgotten the occurrence. In 1863, there was a prosecu-
tion in England for larceny of a leaf from a parish registry that hap-
pened sixty years before.7 4 Such a state of affairs obviously leads to
abuse and prejudice. To remedy the situation, time limitations upon
criminal prosecutions were initiated. These boundaries are of two
sorts: those governing intervals between commission of the crime and
commencement of the prosecution; and those regulating the time gap
between commencement and final disposition. The first relates to state
statutes of limitation; the second to speedy trial, a federally imposed
constitutional requirement in state proceedings.
The CPL in a single section 75 incorporates, with virtually no
change, the provisions on time limitations within which a criminal
action must be commenced contained in the old Code: Class A felony,
at any time; any other felony, within five years; misdemeanor, within
two years; petty offense, within one year; larceny involving violation
of fiduciary duty, within one year of discovery or when discovery should
have been made.76 The tolling provisions of the old Code are also con-
tinued; if the defendant is either outside the state or his whereabouts
67 Compare N.Y. CCP § 135 with N.Y. CPL § 20.40(4)(c).
68 Compare N.Y. CCP §§ 134-a -137 with N.Y. CPL § 20.40(4)(c), (d), (e).
69 N.Y. CPL § 20.40(4)(a).
70 d. § 20A0(4)(b).
711d. § 20.40(4)(g).
72 Old N.Y. Penal Law §§ 1301, 1930(2).
73 Id. § 1930(4).
74 A. V. c=ENTS, CmiNAL LAW & PRoCEDURE 710 (1952).
75 N.Y. CPL § 30.10.
76 N.Y. CCP §§ 141, 141-a, 142.
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are unknown the period is extended by a maximum of five years.77
Similarly, a prosecution that is timely commenced is not defeated by
dismissal of complaint or indictment beyond the period of limitation.78
A new provision, relating to misconduct in office, sets the period at five
years after termination of service.79
Three troublesome questions repeatedly arose under the old Code
and judge-made or common law with respect to time limitations, and
only one has been resolved by the CPL:
(1) When does the action commence? The CPL resolves this
question, albeit in two widely separated and varying sections defining
the term, by fixing the time either upon the filing of an indictment in
a superior court, or filing an accusatory instrument in the lower crimi-
nal court.8 0 The old Code required both the filing of a complaint and
the issuance of a warrant of arrest if an indictment was not filed.81 The
usual wording of the statute, "All actions for ... shall be commenced"
within a specified time, has been interpreted to require more than
merely filing a complaint with a magistrate and the issuance by him of
a warrant in order to commence the action. 82
(2) Suppose an action has been commenced for murder (no time
limitation) six years after the death of the victim. The jury returns a
verdict of guilty of manslaughter, first degree (five year limitation).
May the defendant lawfully be punished under this verdict? Man-
slaughter is a lesser included crime on a charge of murder and ordinarily
such conviction on the greater charge is valid. But, for purposes of
time limitation, the general rule is that if it is too late to prosecute for
manslaughter, it is too late to convict of manslaughter under any form
of indictment or information. 83 The highest court of the state, divided
four-to-three, took exception to this rule under the old Code almost
seventy years ago.84 The CPL is silent on this critical question.
(3) The basic question on time limitation is whether the issue is
a jurisdictional one that may be raised at any time, or merely a pro-
cedural bar or affirmative defense which is waived if not raised prior to
verdict. For example, suppose that an action has been commenced for
77 Compare N.Y. CPL § 30.10(4)(a) with N.Y. CCP § 143.
78 Compare N.Y. CPL § 30.10(4)(b) with N.Y. CCP § 144-a.
79 N.Y. CPL § 30.10(3)(a).
SOd. §§ 1.20(16)(a), 100.05.
81 N.Y. CCP § 144.
82 Dubbs v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 799, 130 So. 36 (1930); Jarrett v. State, 49 Okla. Crim.
162, 292 P. 888 (1930).
83 See Annot., 3 A.L.R. 1331 (1919).
84 People v. Austin, 170 N.Y. 585, 63 N.E. 1120 (1902), af'g 63 App. Div. 383, 71
N.Y.S. 601 (2d Dep't 1901).
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manslaughter seven years after the death of the victim and a conviction
is obtained for that crime in some degree. The defendant had been out
of the jurisdiction for at least two years between the death of the victim
and commencement of the action. The question of time limitation is
raised by defendant for the first time in a collateral attack by coram
nobis. If the court sustains the writ, may the defendant be tried again?
If the limitation is jurisdictional, the answer is "no," as it happens to
be in many states.8 5 The CPL is again silent on this important question.
Former Jeopardy
In Palko v. Connecticut,"" the defendant had been indicted for
first degree murder, convicted after jury trial of murder in the second
degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. The state appealed under
a statute authorizing such appeal "upon all questions of law," and won
a new trial. Defendant on retrial was convicted of murder in the first
degree and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that only when jeopardy subjected a defendant to" a hardship
so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it" did due pro-
cess in the fourteenth amendment apply.87 Thirty-two years later-
after the Revision Commission had adopted the former jeopardy
provisions in their present form- the Court announced, "Palko v.
Connecticut is overruled."88
Authoritative standards on what constitutes former jeopardy must
now be formulated for state proceedings by the Supreme Court and not
by state legislation or state court pronouncements. The CPL provisions
must accordingly be examined in the light of federal standards. The
CPL flatly restates the state constitutional prohibition that a person
may not be twice prosecuted for the same offense.89 Separate prosecu-
tion for offenses based upon the same transaction are also barred with
six exceptions.90 One of these exceptions is when each offense involves
"loss or other consequence to a different victim." 91 In Ashe v. Swen-
son,92 Ashe was acquitted after trial by jury of the robbery of Donald
Knight, one of six victims held-up while engaged in a poker game.
85 Compare People v. McGee, 1 Cal. 2d 611, 36 P.2d 378 (1934) with People v. Austin,
170 N.Y. 585, 63 N.E. 1120 (1902).
86 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
87 Id. at 328.
88 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
89 N.Y. CPL § 40.20(1). Compare N.Y. CONsr. art. I, § 6 ("subject to be put
in jeopardy twice for the same offense") with U.S. CONST. amend. V ("subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb').
90 N.Y. CPL § 40.20(2).
91ld. § 40.20(2)(e).
92 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
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Ashe was one of four alleged robbers arrested. He was then tried for
the robbery of another victim, Roberts, and convicted. The Supreme
Court reversed this conviction, in a seven-to-one determination. The
opinion of the Court found the doctrine of collateral estoppel part of
the fifth amendment made applicable to the states by the fourteenth,
and held that the first acquittal was an implicit finding by the jury that
Ashe not only did not rob Knight, but also that he was not one of the
band of robbers at all. Three justices adopting the "same transaction"
test would have barred the conviction even if he had participated in
robbing the second victim. A single dissent by the Chief Justice applied
the "same evidence" test - apparently adopted by the CPL - which
was not met because evidence of a different victim was required in
each trial.
If criminal proceedings are nullified by a subsequent court order,
there is no bar to further prosecution if the court "authorizes the people
to obtain a new accusatory instrument charging the same offense."93 In
Price v. Georgia,94 the Supreme Court unanimously condemned this
procedure for recharging. Price, on indictment for murder, was con-
victed of voluntary manslaughter. His conviction was reversed by the
state appellate court because of an erroneous jury instruction. Price
was again placed on trial for murder under the original indictment.
The jury in the second trial, like the first, found defendant guilty of
voluntary manslaughter. The Supreme Court, considering the conten-
tion that the defendant suffered no greater punishment on the second
conviction concluded: "We must reject this contention. The Double
Jeopardy clause.., is cast in terms of the risk or hazard of conviction,
not of the ultimate legal consequences of the verdict .... There is a
significant difference to the accused whether he is being tried for mur-
der or manslaughter."9 5
The decisions of the Supreme Court announced contemporane-
ously with enactment of the CPL have cast a long constitutional penum-
bra over some of its provisions. The CPL defines a previous prosecution
as one in which the charge has been filed anywhere and "[p]roceeds to
93 N.Y. CPL § 40.30(4). The other five exceptions for separate trials of offenses based
on the same transaction are: offenses having "substantially different elements"; where
each offense contains an element not an element of the other and each is "designed to
prevent very different kinds of harm or evil"; where one offense is possession and the
other use, other than the sale of contraband; where one offense results in injury and
the other homicide when death results after prosecution for the first offense; and where
the first prosecution is terminated in another jurisdiction for insufficient proof of an
element not requisite for proof of the offense in this state.
94398 U.S. 323 (1970).
95 Id. at 331 & n.10.
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a trial stage and a witness is sworn."9 6 But in a new provision, the CPL
authorizes appeal by the prosecution upon a trial order of dismissal at
"the conclusion of the people's case or at the conclusion of all the evi-
dence."97 In Kepner v. United States,98 a lawyer in Manila was charged
with embezzlement of the funds of a client. He was tried and acquitted.
Upon appeal by the Government authorized by statute, the Phillipine
high court reversed the judgment for error. Kepner was retried, found
guilty, and sentenced to imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that
Kepner was placed in jeopardy a second time contrary to the fifth
amendment which applied directly to the Phillipines. Justice Holmes,
in dissent with two others, observed: "[I]t seems to me that logically
and rationally a man cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy
in the same cause, however often he may be tried. The jeopardy is one
continuing jeopardy from its beginning to the end of the cause." 0 After
citing this case, Justice Cardozo in Palko, holding that due process did
not incorporate and make applicable to the states the double jeopardy
provision in the fifth amendment, said: "Right-minded men, as we
learn from those opinions, could reasonably, even if mistakenly, be-
lieve that a second trial was lawful in prosecutions subject to the fifth
amendment, if it was all in the same case."1 00
However cogent the logic of Justice Holmes, it was not the opinion
of the Court. However authoritative the holding of Justice Cardozo, it
has been overruled. The CPL, in following this logic and authority,
has again set sail on a sea of constitutional doubt.
COMMENCEMENT OF PROSECUTION
Criminal actions may be commenced only by filing an appropriate
accusatory instrument in court.'0 ' Such instruments include indict-
ments filed in a superior court (supreme or county) that must include
at least one charge of the grade of felony or misdemeanor. They also
include the following five instruments that are filed in a local criminal
court:
(1) Information, verified by complainant, for misdemeanors only,
96 N.Y. CPL § 40.30(1). The same definition results if a plea of guilty is entered.
Excepted are cases in which the court lacks jurisdiction, when the prosecution has been
procured by the defendant, without the prosecutor's knowledge, in order to avoid
prosecution for a greater offense, or when the proceedings are nullified by court order
that authorizes or directs a new charge or trial. Id. § 40.30(2), (3), (4).
97 Id. § 290.10.
08195 U.S. 100 (1904).
99 Id. at 134 (dissenting opinion).
100 302 U.S. at 323.
101 N.Y. CPL art. 100.
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serves both to commence action and as a basis for its prosecu-
tion;
(2) Misdemeanor Complaint, same as information except that de-
fendant's consent is necessary if it is to serve as basis for prose-
cution;
(3) Felony Complaint, same as misdemeanor complaint, except
that it charges only felonies;
(4) Prosecutor's information, a new instrument containing a non-
verified charge for misdemeanors filed by the district attorney,
serving both to commence action and a basis for its prosecu-
tion;
(5) Simplified traffic information, a new instrument, same as pros-
ecutor's information except it relates only to traffic infractions
and misdemeanors and is filed by a police officer.
Defendant's appearance upon filing an accustatory instrument may
be compelled by the local criminal court by issuance and execution of
a warrant of arrest or summons, formerly known as a court summons.
Prior to such filing, defendant's appearance may be compelled by an
arrest without a warrant or by an appearance ticket, formerly known as
a police summons.102 A warrant of arrest may be issued upon filing of
any accusatory instrument, except a traffic information. Its issuance is
entirely in the discretion of the court and a summons may be substitu-
ted.103
Major change is made in the law of arrest without a warrant and
its incidental consequences, such as station-house bail and issuance of
in-lieu-of-arrest appearance tickets. At common law, the validity of an
arrest depended upon whether (a) the arresting person was a peace
officer or private person; (b) the offense was a felony or a misdemeanor;
(c) the offense was committed in the officer's presence; and (d) the na-
ture of the reasonable or probable cause for the arrest. The last require-
ment is the heart of the demand of the fourth amendment with respect
to "seizure of... persons." Reasonable cause for arrest also affects the
validity of search and seizure of evidence without a search warrant,
again a matter of final determination as a federal question by the Su-
preme Court.
The major innovations effected by the CPL are these: (a) Elimina-
tion of the requirement of commission of misdemeanors in their pres-
ence for valid arrests by police officers and peace officers acting pursuant
102Id. art. 110.
103 Id. arts. 120 & 10.
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to their special duties. This is a salubrious provision because at the
time of summary arrest determination of whether the crime committed
is of the grade of Class E felony or Class A misdemeanor is frequently
difficult to make, e.g., whether the value of an item stolen is more or
less than $250. (b) For non-police peace officers, curtailment of their
powers of arrest when not acting pursuant to their special duties. (c)
For both police and non-police peace officers, introduction of the factor
of geographical area of employment to affect power to arrest. (d) For
non-felony arrests, determination in what county such arrests may law-
fully be made.104 How these new factors operate to affect the validity of
arrests is set forth below.
What happens between arrest and arraignment of a prisoner cur-
rently is called "The Custodial Merry-Go-Round."'10 Despite existing
statutory commands that a prisoner upon arrest be taken to the nearest
court in session, "without unnecessary delay"'0 6 or "immediately,"' 0 7
for decades contrary administrative police regulations have required
that he be taken "to the station house of the precinct of arrest for
search and record."'' 08 For example, in New York City, if printing and
photographing is necessary,0 9 the prisoner must be taken to either the
104 Id. art. 140; see Table IV infra.
105 See Ludwig, Stopping the Custodial Mery-go-Round, 31 QUEENS BAR BULL. 7
(1968).
1o6 N.Y. CCP § 165.
107 N.Y.C. AnmrN. CODE § 435-12.0 (1963).
108 N.Y.C. POLicE DEP'r, RurLs AND PaocEntmRs ch. 9, 5.0 (1970).
109 The CPL requires fingerprinting for all felonies and those misdemeanors defined
in the Penal Law. N.Y. CPL § 160.10(1)(c) also requires fingerprinting for non-penal law
misdemeanors that would constitute a felony if the defendant had a previous conviction.
There are five such "outside" misdemeanors: N.Y. VEH. & TaM. L. §§ 380 (use of ve-
hicle to transport dangerous chemicals -two prior convictions, same crime), 1192 (driv-
ing while intoxicated - one prior conviction, same crime) (McKinney 1960); N.Y. ALco.
BEV. CONTROL L. §§ 152 (sale of illicit alcohol-one prior conviction, same crime, or
under § 154), 154 (using premises for illicit alcohol - one prior conviction, same crime,
or under § 152) (McKinney 1946); N.Y. ELECTON L. art. 16 (§§ 420-462) (election franchise
violations-one prior conviction under same article) (McKinney 1964). In addition, in
the case of a single violation, i.e., loitering for the purpose of deviate sexual behavior,
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.35(3) (McKinney 1967), fingerprinting is required. N.Y. CPL
§ 160.10(l)(d).
N.Y. CCP § 552 requires fingerprinting and photographing for all felonies, "outside"
misdemeanors and the loitering violation, as in the CPL, but sharply delimits the require-
ment for other misdemeanors to thirteen in all, principally petty criminal conduct indi-
cative of repetitive or more dangerous behavior, e.g., possession of weapons, burglar's tools
and narcotics.
Misdemeanor arrests in 1970 (up 21.1 percent over 1969) amounted to 94,024 and
misdemeanor summons (up 1.5 percent over 1969) amounted to 147,019 in the City of
New York, or a total of 241,043 misdemeanor cases. The felony arrests in 1970 (up 26.3
percent over 1969) amounted to 94,024. It is fair to assume that the extension of the re-
quirement of fingerprinting and photographing to all misdemeanors (arrest and appearance
tickets) will result in the taking and forwarding of at least one-quarter million more in
the City of New York alone, commencing September 1, 1971. Unlike procedure under the
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east end of Brooklyn or the south end of Manhattan for "mugging,"
simply because the nation's largest police department possesses only
two cameras for this purpose. The consequences are a lengthy inter-
precinct custodial merry-go-round, sometimes involving more than
sixty miles of travel by the prisoner and at least two police officers
through heavy city traffic.
The CPL partially alleviates this avalanching impasse within the
City of New York in non-felony cases in three ways:
(1) Appearance ticket. After arrest, the arresting officer may re-
lease his prisoner from custody and serve him with an appearance ticket,
but is not required to do so if the prisoner is under the influence of
alcohol or other drugs.110 An appearance ticket may under such circum-
stances be issued by a non-police public servant in the line of authorized
duty'1 and similarly by a police officer, in the case of an arrest by a
private person, when unable to arraign the prisoner promptly."2 If
station-house bail cannot be posted by an arrestee, under all of these
circumstances, an appearance ticket may also issue." 3
(2) Station-house bail. For all non-felony arrests, the desk officer
may fix pre-arraignment bail- $500 maximum for Class A misdemean-
ors, $250 for Class B, and $100 for violations and infractions." 4 Fixing
bail solely upon consideration of the offense charged is quite improper.
The test ought to be the probability that defendant will appear, and
this probability is ascertained by the gravity of the offense charged,
but, in addition, many other factors, such as those bearing on roots in
the community.115
(3) Discharge by arresting police officer. Under the old Code,
only the court could discharge a prisoner once an arrest was made. The
CPL authorizes the arresting police officer to release his prisoner if he
is satisfied after further investigation that there is not reasonable cause
to believe the arrestee committed the offense." 6 While prompt rectifica-
tion is desirable, clearly such provision requires careful implementation
by police procedures, such as approval of a superior officer, to assure
that justice has the appearance of justice.
old Code, these must be individually processed (forwarded and return of record) through
the New York State Identification and Intelligence System in Albany rather than through
the Bureau of Criminal Identification of the police in Manhattan.
110 N.Y. CPL §§ 140,20(2)(a), 150.20(1), (2).
111Id. § 140.40(2).
112 Id.
113Id. §§ 140.20(2)(b), 140.40(2).
14 Id. §§ 140.20(2)(b), (8), 140.27(8), 140.40(2), 150.30(2).
115 See Ludwig, Bail, in HANBOOK ON BAIL, COMTLA-rrS, Ava A1GNmxNT 104 (Office of
the Queens Dist. Att'y 1969).
116 N.Y. CPL § 140.20(4).
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COURT FIxED BAIL
Does any defendant have a right to bail? On the constitutional
level, both state and federal provisions contain prohibitions against
excessive bail, but not guarantees of bail."7 Most state constitutions
contain guarantees of bail in all but capital cases. The historic Judiciary
Act of 1789118-considered as fundamental as the Constitution itself
that took effect during the same year, contains the same guarantee. Un-
der current provisions in New York, bail in all cases in whatever court
is discretionary and not mandatory. No explicit decision of the Supreme
Court has thus far made the prohibition with respect to excessive bail
contained in the eighth amendment applicable to the states.119
Any right to bail in New York is purely statutory. Under the old
Code, in non-felony cases pre-conviction bail was mandatory' 20 and
post-conviction bail discretionary.121 In felony cases, pre-conviction bail
was discretionary.122 The CPL continues these provisions.123 Generally
accepted case law criteria for the exercise of discretion are set forth to
establish the central question in pre-conviction bail. "The kind and
degree of control or restriction that is necessary to secure his court at-
tendance when required."'124 For post-conviction bail, a criterion in
addition to likelihood of court appearance, is set up: "[t]hat the appeal
is palpably without merit alone justifies, but does not require, de-
nial.', 2 5
In addition to restatement of criteria, the CPL makes more flexible
the kind of security to assure court appearance by introducing two in-
termediate devices between outright release on recognizance and a bail
bond, viz., a partially secured surety or appearance bond and an un-
secured similar instrument. 126
PROCEEDINGS PRELIMINARY TO TRIAL
The identical felony case may still be processed in two separate
criminal court systems - local and superior. Defendants in misde-
meanor cases within the City of New York, but not outside, are still
117 N.Y. CoNsr. art. I, § 5; U.S. CONSr. amend. VIII.
118 Act of Sept. 4, 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
119 See Table In supra.
120 N.Y. CCP § 553(1).
1211d. § 555(2).
221 d. §§ 552, 553(2).
123 N.Y. CPL §§ 510.30(l), 530.20, 530.50.
124 Id. § 510.30(2)(a). The seven criteria have been enumerated in People ex rel. Gon-
zales v. Warden, 21 N.Y.2d 18, 233 N.E.2d 265, 286 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1967), cert. denied, 390
US. 971 (1968), and in FED. R. Cium. P. 46(c).
125 N.Y. CPL § 510.30(2)(b).
126 Id. §§ 500.10(18), (19), 520.10(1)(e), (f), (g), (h).
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entitled to preliminary hearings in the lower criminal court just as in
felony cases. 127 Motion practice and the grounds for such motions re-
state present case law and are virtually identical both in the local crim-
inal court for petty offenses, misdemeanors and felonies, and in the
superior court for indictments.128
While the power of the grand jury to inquire into any crime is
confidently asserted under the old Code, 129 the practice uniformly has
been to proceed by indictment only if at least one count amounted to
a felony, unless a superior court certifies presentation of a pending mis-
demeanor case to the grand jury. 30 Under the CPL, an indictment
need contain no count charging a felony and may charge petty offenses
so long as a single count charges a misdemeanor.'31 The expanded op-
tion to proceed by indictment in non-felonious offenses is useful in
those misdemeanor cases in which either minimum exposure of com-
plainants or rapid procedure is necessary and desirable at the accusa-
tory state, e.g., undercover agents in narcotic cases, victims of blackmail
threats (aggravated harassment) and sex offenses, and witnesses whose
departure from the jurisdiction is imminent. The grand jury continues
its power of inquiry into conduct of public servants, whether criminal
or not. 32 It may act by indictment, direction to file information, dis-
missal of charge or submission of report. 33
Significant change is made in the form of indictment. At the close
of the 18th century, all felonies except petty larceny and mayhem were
subject to capital punishment at common law. During the decade end-
ing 1818, 7,074 were sentenced to death. Of the 808 actually executed,
645, or 80 percent were for offenses other than murder1 34 Every judi-
cial effort was made to nullify the imposition of the extreme penalty.
The common-law indictment was the principal procedural device to
achieve humanitarian restraint. Misspelling the defendant's name, or
omitting his title "Esq." was fatal. The same was the case for failure to
use technical words, such as home-made Latin "Burglariter" in setting
out the crime. One hundred yards of parchment was required for the
indictment for treason in O'Connell's case. 35
The old Code in 1881 eliminated these devices of nullification. In
127 Id. § 170.75.
28 Cf. id. §§ 170.30, 180.10-180.80, 210.20.
129 N.Y. CCP § 252.
130 Id. § 57; cf. N.Y. CPL § 170.25.
131 N.Y. CPL § 200.10.
132 Id. § 190.55(2)(c).
133 Id. § 190.60.
1.34 REPORT OF SELECt COMm!. ON CAPITAL PUNISHmENT, supra note 4, at viii.
135 3 St. Tr. (n.s.) 1 (1844).
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1929, the pendulum swung as far as conceivable from common-law plead-
ing when Caleb Baumes'3 6 capped his crusade against crime by placing
a form indictment of just eighteen words and the defendant's name in
the Code and having it declared sufficient by the legislature. 37 Coupled
with the mandate of a bill of particulars to be supplied by the district
attorney, the short form indictment has been upheld against attack
that the district attorney, and not the grand jury, is really making the
accusation when he supplied time, place, circumstances and identity of
victim in the bill.138
The CPL adopts a neutral course between the abbreviated "no-
tice" pleading and the over technical "fact" accusation of the common
law. It requires that the indictment both name the offense and the acts
constituting it, as under the old Code. 39 The CPL, unlike the old Code,
also requires allegation that the offense was committed in a designated
county and at some designated time or period of time.140 The CPL re-
states case law under the old Code as expansively as possible on joinder
of offenses and consolidation of indictments. 141
The remaining significant change in accusatory proceedings are
provisions that fortify the indictment against quashing by the court. At
the close of the last fiscal year, one county within the City of New York
had 31.4 percent of its 372 indictments dismissed before trial.142 Cur-
rent procedure under the old Code, requires that the grand jury receive
none but legal evidence 143 and the quantum of evidence to indict
amounts to that necessary to convict, if uncontradicted, viz., proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt.144 There is a statutory prescription that the
determination of sufficiency of evidence be "in their judgment"'' 4 5 and
a case law requirement that the defendant present prima facie proof of
136Assemblyman, 1909-1913; Senator, 1919-1930.
137 N.Y. CCP § 295-d: "The grand jury of the county of Albany, by this indictment
accuse Richard Roe of the following crime: Murder."
13s People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16, 171 N.E. 890 (1930).
'39 Compare N.Y. CPL § 200.50, with N.Y. CCP §§ 275, 276.
140 Compare N.Y. CPL § 200.59(5), (6), with N.Y. CCP §§ 280, 284; see also People
v. Hetenyi, 277 App. Div. 810, 98 N.Y.S.2d 990 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 801 N.Y. 757, 98 N.E.
819 (1950); People v. Guiley, 222 N.Y. 548, 118 N.E. 1072 (1917).
141 Compare N.Y. CPL §§ 200.20, 200.40, with N.Y. CCP § 279; see also People v.
Bussey, 297 N.Y. 627, 75 N.E2d 742 (1947) (two murders committed on successive Saturdays,
indictments consolidated); People v. Virga, 259 App. Div. 706, 18 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (1st Dep't),
aff'd, 285 N.Y. 725, 34 N.E.2d 895 (1941) (two kidnappings, one in April and the other
in July); People v. Ludano, 277 N.Y. 348, 14 N.E.2d 433 (1938) (sixty-two separate crimes
of compulsory prostitution).
142 REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATVE BoAD or THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK, A 65 (1970).
'43 N.Y. CCP § 256.
1441d. § 251.
145 Id.
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insufficient evidence in order to have the grand jury minutes inspected
and the indictment set aside.146 In practice, the reviewing judge fre-
quently assumes veto power over the findings of fact by a grand jury,
and substitutes his judgment for theirs. Motions to inspect minutes and
set aside indictments are granted on mimeographed notices and affi-
davits, and even on oral applications.
The federal and state constitutions contain virtually identical pro-
visions concerning indictment by a grand jury. But the federal district
court, mindful that it is a creature of Congress and the grand jury a
body created by the Constitution, accords an indictment an overwhelm-
ing presumption that it is based upon competent evidence. A heavy
burden is placed on a defendant to overcome this presumption. The
burden has been made even heavier by recent decisions. In United
States v. Costello,147 defendant was convicted of tax fraud after trial at
which the prosecution called 144 witnesses and introduced 368 exhibits.
The grand jury had heard only three witnesses, each without firsthand
knowledge. The Supreme Court unanimously held that an indictment
is sufficient even though based entirely upon hearsay evidence.
Neither the Fifth Amendment nor any other constitutional pro-
vision prescribes the kind of evidence upon which grand juries
must act.... If indictments were open to challenge on the ground
that there was inadequate or incomplete evidence before the grand
jury, the resulting delay would be great indeed. The result of such
a rule would be that before trial on the merits a defendant could
always insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine the compe-
tency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury.148
The CPL takes a step, albeit not a giant one, in the direction of
federal procedure on challenge to an indictment for insufficiency of
evidence. First, the quantum of proof necessary to indict has been
reduced from the standard of proof necessary to convict, if uncontra-
dicted, to "reasonable cause to believe" defendant committed the of-
fense.149 This is the identical standard for an arrest without a warrant.
In People v. Nitzberg,150 the Court reversed a conviction of murder
because the evidence before the grand jury, not the evidence at trial,
failed to meet the standard of sufficiency to convict. The CPL overrules
146Id. § 313; see also In re Montgomery, 126 App. Div. 72, 110 N.Y.S. 793 (1st Dep't
1908); People v. Steinhardt, 47 Misc. 252, 93 N.Y.S. 1026 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1905).
147 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
148Id. at 562; see also United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966); Lawn v. United
States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958)-unconstitutionally seized or tainted evidence before grandjury is not a basis to abate prosecution and require a new indictment.
149 N.Y. CPL § 190.65(1)(b).
150 289 N.Y. 523, 47 N.E.2d 37 (1943).
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Nitzberg and moves in the direction of Costello: the validity of a denial
of a motion to inspect and dismiss an indictment is not reviewable upon
an appeal from an ensuing judgment of conviction.' 51
Second, the requirement that the evidence before the grand jury
be "legally sufficient"'15 2 has been relaxed so as to make competent
certain hearsay evidence in the form of a certified report by a public
servant or agency, or a person employed by them, concerning examina-
tions, comparisons and tests of a scientific or professional nature. 53
Finally, the CPL is explicit that challenges to indictments on
grounds of insufficiency of evidence must be in writing and "must con-
tain sworn allegations of fact supporting such claim."' 54 If appellate
courts insist that this provision is not directory but fundamental for
dismissal of an indictment, then the current number of dismissals will
be substantially reduced.
DIscovERY
The most significant innovation in the CPL is the codification of
rules of discovery borrowed almost verbatim from the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure which were drastically revised in 1966. Some ex-
changes between adversaries were required under the old Code, and
these are continued in the CPL: a bill of particulars supplementing
the indictment and concerning the nature and character of the charge,
but not containing evidentiary matter, to be supplied by the prosecu-
tor;' 5 notice by defendant of intent to rely on defense of mental disease
and defect;156 and the bill of particulars required to be furnished by
defendant upon demand by the prosecutor concerning alibi. 57 In ad-
dition, to a limited degree, the power of "courts of criminal jurisdiction
to compel the discovery of documents in furtherance of justice" was
acknowledged, "but concededly there were only the beginnings or at
least the glimmerings of such a doctrine."'5 5l
For sixteen years, debate raged over the adoption of the revised
1966 federal rule. Opponents argued that discovery in criminal cases
251 N.Y. CPL § 210.30(6).
1521d. § 190.65(l)(a).
155 Id. § 190.30(2).
154 Id. § 210.30(2).
155 Compare N.Y. CCP §§ 295-g, 295-h, 295-i with N.Y. CPL § 200.90.
156 Compare N.Y. CCP § 336 with N.Y. CPL § 250.10.
157 Compare N.Y. CCP § 295-I with N.Y. CPL § 250.20. In Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78 (1970), a divided Court sustained a state alibi-notice statute that specifically re-
quired reciprocal notice by the prosecution naming the witnesses to be used in rebuttal of
the defense. The Court explicitly left open what the result would be under a non-reciprocal
statute, such as that in the CPL. Id. at 82 n.ll.
158 People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 27, 156 N.E. 84, 86 (1927).
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would encourage perjury, intimidation of prosecution witnesses and,
unlike civil litigation, unequally favor defendants because their privi-
lege against self-incrimination would be a shield against comparable
disclosure to the prosecution. Proponents urged that the higher stakes
in criminal cases (infamy of conviction, loss of liberty), compared with
monetary loss in civil litigation, required at least as much discovery,
and probably more, in criminal matters as that under existing rules of
civil procedure that permitted virtually unlimited discovery. Other
countries, such as England and Canada, and other systems, such as
military courts, had found disclosure successful.
Whatever the merits, the proponents have prevailed, and, more-
over, are likely to prevail still further. During the last term, the Su-
preme Court said that "[t]he adversary system of trial is hardly an end
to itself; it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute
right always to conceal their cards until played."'1 9 As a matter of due
process in the fourteenth amendment, the Court held, in Mooney v.
Holohan,160 a conviction void because the evidence, favorable to the
defense, was suppressed by the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland'," ex-
panded Mooney: "We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespec-
tive of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."'0 26
In 1946, rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, was
first adopted and, in effect, provided the defendant with access only to
material that would otherwise have been available to him but for its
impounding by the Government. The drastic revision of 1966, adopted
by the CPL, makes much more evidence available, and federal decisions
prior to revision have virtually no current effect. Under the comparable
provisions of the revised rule 16 and article 240 of the CPL, discovery
by defendant is divided into three classes: (1) Automatic, mandatory,
unconditional discovery upon motion by defendant for (a) his testimony
before the indicting grand jury, and (b) a written or recorded statement
(other than an intercepted communication under authorized eaves-
dropping) made to law enforcement personnel or their agents; (2) Dis-
cretionary discovery by defendant concerning physical or mental
examinations, or scientific tests or experiments, subject to condition of
granting a prosecution motion for discovery of property of the same
159 William v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 82.
160 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
161373 U.S. 83 (1963).
162 Id. at 87.
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kind provided there is a showing that the property sought by the pros-
ecution is (a) not exempt, i.e., memoranda, work papers, witness' state-
ments taken by defense, (b) material to prosecution preparation, and
(c) reasonable; and (3) Discretionary discovery by defendant of other
property, (a) subject to condition of prosecutorial discovery, limited
above, (b) not exempt, (c) specifically designated, (d) a showing of
materiality to defense, and (e) a showing of reasonableness. 163 Provision
is made for subsequent orders of protection and in camera opposition
by the prosecution which shall be sealed and made part of the record on
appeal. 164 An order of disclosure imposes a continuing duty and non-
compliance is subject to a variety of sanctions.16 5
Further liberalization of criminal discovery is clearly indicated.
While discovery under the CPL falls short of that permitted under fed-
eral rule 16, some states currently exceed the federal requirements. 166
The American Bar Association's Project on Standards for Criminal
Justice has recommended "more permissive discovery practices for
criminal cases than is provided by applicable law in any jurisdiction
in the United States."' 67
PRi-TRiA. MOTIONS
Reference has been made to the motion to dismiss an indictment
for insufficiency of evidence before the grand jury. 68 This is one of
nine motions addressed to the indictment or information that now must
be made prior to plea. Moreover, these motions cannot be made piece-
meal: the challenges must issue in a single omnibus attack. 69 Under
the old Code, the defendant was first arraigned, furnished a copy of the
indictment, entered a plea to it and then a time was set within which
to make motions. 70 Former jeopardy was a plea that raised an issue for
the trier of fact,171 instead of the more rational disposition under the
CPL as a question of law by motion before plea. The archaic demurrer
required a motion to withdraw a plea of not guilty before it could be
interposed under the old Code. If the demurrer was overruled, a second
plea to the indictment was required. 7 2 The CPL, with its single manda-
163 N.Y. CPL § 240.20.
164 1d. § 240.20(5).
1651 Id. § 240.40.
166See Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J. 732
(1967); Louisell, Criminal Discovery, 49 CALI. L. REv. 56 (1961).
167 ABA, DiscovERY AND PROCEDURE BEa~oR TRuL 1 (Tent. Draft 1969).
168 See notes 149-51 and accompanying text supra.
169 N.Y. CPL § 210.20.
170 N.Y. CCP § 332.
171 Id.
172 Id. § 312.
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tory motion in umbrella form before pleading, has shortcircuited dis-
position of challenges to the indictment.
Concerning motions to suppress evidence to be offered at trial by
the prosecution, made after plea and before trial, the CPL expands
existing statutory motions173 by adding two new classes: (1) potential
testimony on identification of the accused that would be inadmissible
because of a previous identification improperly made by the witness; 174
and (2) the "fruit of the poisonous tree,"175 i.e., tangible evidence ob-
tained as a consequence of unlawful search and seizure, eavesdropping
or involuntary confession.1 71 Like the challenges made to the indict-
ment, the five addressed to potential evidence must be made in a single
omnibus motion before trial.177 In the case of potential testimony con-
cerning confessions and identification, notice of intention by the pros-
ecution to offer this evidence must be served upon the defendant to
enable him seasonably to move to suppress before trial.11 8 Failure to
give notice is sanctioned by exclusion of the evidence, unless, of course,
defendant moved to suppress without notice and the motion was de-
nied.179 Troublesome questions of conflict-of-laws on those motions
under current provisions of the old Code are avoided, e.g., whether a
party is collaterally estopped by an adverse decision on suppression in
the local criminal court from relitigating the matter in the superior
court after indictment. Those are solved by requiring that all such mo-
tions in felony cases be made in the superior court whether pending in
that court or the local criminal court, and that in all non-felony cases,
the motion be made in the local criminal court. The superior court
shall transfer undetermined pending motions in cases reduced from fel-
onies to the local criminal court.18 0 On hearing all such motions, the
CPL restates existing case law and makes hearsay evidence admissible.18 1
TRIAL
The most controversial provision on the formation of a jury is the
mandate that voir dire be conducted directly by counsel rather than by
the court: "The court must permit both parties, commencing with the
173 Id. §§ 813-a-813-e (tangible property obtained by unlawful search and seizure),
813-j-813-m (eavesdropping evidence unlawfully obtained).
174 N.Y. CPL § 710.20(5); see also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
175 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
176 N.Y. CPL § 710.20(4).
177Id. § 710.40.
1 8 Id. § 710.30.
179Id. § 710.30(3).
180 Id. § 710.50.
181 Compare id. § 710.60(4), with People v. Coffey, 12 N.Y.2d 443, 191 N.E2d 263, 240
N.Y.S.2d 721 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 916 (1964).
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People, to examine the prospective jurors, individually or collectively,
regarding their qualifications to serve as jurors in the action."'182 This
restates practice under the old Code.183 Recently, the Administrative
Board of the Judicial Conference adopted a rule implementing the old
Code that mandates that the judge presiding (1) initiate voir dire by
identifying parties and counsel and outlining the case; and (2) put to
prospective jurors questions on their qualifications. Discretionary with
the judge is permitting the parties to examine jurors on their qualifi-
cations.8 4 The federal rule simply places the question whether counsel
or court conduct the examination of prospective jurors in the discre-
tion of the court. 185 A survey of eighty-seven judicial districts in the fed-
eral court system shows that in criminal cases the examination is
conducted by the court in fifty-three, by both court and counsel in
twenty-two, and by counsel alone in only twelve. 18 6 Exclusion of counsel
from direct examination of prospective jurors has frequently been up-
held as not an abuse of discretion and no denial of the right to trial by
a fair and impartial jury guaranteed by the sixth amendment. 187 Critics
of judge-conducted examinations complain that efficiency and elimina-
tion of delay ought not be made paramount to the communicative and
persuasive process that questioning by counsel initiates. 188 Whatever
the balance, the CPL and the newest rule of the Administrative Board
are on a collision course and one or the other must give way to amend-
ment before the effective date of the CPL.
The CPL contains a new mandatory provision for preliminary
instruction by the court on jury demeanor during trial, including
specifically a prohibition against viewing the scene of the offense. 18 9
Beyond the mandatory preliminary instructions, nothing is changed
in the order of trial prescribed by the old Code: the prosecutor must
open, and the defense has the option to decline opening statement;
evidence in chief to support the indictment is then presented by the
prosecution; evidence supporting the defense is next offered; respec-
182 N.Y. CPL § 270.15(1).
183 N.Y. COP § 369: "[T]he defendant must be informed by the court or under its
direction, that if he intend to challenge an individual juror, he must do so when the
juror appears." Id. § 370. "A challenge to an individual juror may be taken either by
the people or by the defendant."
18422 N.Y.C.R.R. 20.13 (adopted Dec. 17, 1970, effective Jan. 1, 1971).
185 Fm. R. Cium. P. 24.
186 The Jury System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 466 (1960).
187 Rodgers v. United States, 402 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1968); Ungerleider v. United
States, 5 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 169 U.S. 574 (1926).
188 See Youtt, Voir Dire Has Its Proper Uses, 57 A.B.A.J. 38 (1971).
189 N.Y. CPL § 270.40; see also People v. Crimmins, 26 N.Y.2d 319, 258 N.E.2d 708,
310 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1970).
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tively, the parties may offer rebutting evidence, but the court, for good
reason or in furtherance of justice, may permit additional evidence
upon their original case; on conclusion of the evidence, unless the case
is submitted to the jury on either side or both sides, without argument,
the defense commences and the prosecution concludes the argument to
the jury; finally, the court must charge the jury.10 In its charge to the
jury, the court must apply the law to the facts and "need not marshal
or refer to the evidence to any greater extent than is necessary for such
explanation."'' Similarly, all other provisions of the CPL concerning
evidence, standards of proof, trial without jury, and verdict, sub-
stantially restate statutory provisions of the old Code and the case law
interpreting these provisions.
The pre-sentence conference that creates a forum to resolve con-
troversies over information gathered by presentence investigators al-
leviates a long standing abuse.192 All but a handful of the offenses
defined by the Penal Law contain only maximum penalties and no
minimum. Vast discretion is vested in the judge in sentencing, ranging
from unconditional discharge to a maximum of twenty-five years. Yet
this discretion heretofore has been exercised on the basis of an ex parte
report that might contain material easily qualified, explained or con-
troverted, if only defense counsel could be made aware of such material.
Post-judgment motions, like those addressed to the indictment
and made for suppression of evidence, must be made in omnibus form,
and include those made under the old Code and based upon case law
as well as those created by statute.193 A motion to set aside sentence not
previously provided for in the old Code but allowed under case law, is
explicitly set forth. 94
Appeal is not a matter of right under due process; it is purely
statutory. Until Lyons v. Goldstein, 95 there was no way by which a
defendant could question a judgment of conviction after the time to
appeal had expired. This was so even though the court may have lacked
jurisdiction, or the conviction had been obtained on perjured testimony
190 Compare N.Y. CCP § 388 with N.Y. CPL § 260.30.
191 N.Y. CPL § 300.10(2); ci. People v. Montesanto, 236 N.Y. 396, 407, 140 N.E. 932,
936 (1923).
192 N.Y. CPL § 400.10; see also id. § 390.40 (defendant's pre-sentence memorandum).
193 Compare id. § 440.10 with N.Y. CCP §§ 467, 468, 469 (arrest of judgment: lack
of jurisdiction, insanity); see also N.Y. CCP § 465 (new trial: felony trial, defendant absent;
jury receives evidence out of court; jury separated after retiring; verdict by lot; erroneous
instruction to jury; verdict against evidence; newly discovered evidence) N.Y. CPLR art. 70
(McKinney 1963) (habeas corpus); Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N.Y. 19, 47 N.E.2d 425 (1943)
(writ of error coram nobis).
194 N.Y. CPL § 440.20, 440.40.
195 290 N.Y. 19, 47 N.E.2d 425 (1943).
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and was thus a fraud upon the court, or the defendant's constitutional
rights had been violated. To remedy this, the Court of Appeals held
in the Goldstein case that there was inherent power in the trial court
to entertain a motion to vacate a judgment of conviction, in the nature
of the common-law writ of error coram nobis. Later, the legislature
permitted appeals from orders denying motions to vacate judgments.',,
The major innovation on appeal is the authorization of the pros-
ecutor to appeal from a trial order of dismissal, a matter of serious
constitutional proportion.197 Failure to file a notice of appeal within
thirty days, once a fatal, jurisdictional omission, is now subject to a
palliative application so long as it is made within one year of the judg-
ment.19 8
PROGRAM FOR IMPROVEMENT
Ten major modifications are necessary if the CPL is to serve in
superior fashion the ends of a worthwhile statute governing procedure
in the administration of criminal law, viz., acquitting the innocent and
convicting the guilty, certainty of application, celerity of disposition,
and the appearance as well as reality of a just rule.
Celerity of Disposition
Without sacrificing a just or certain disposition or its appearance,
several amendments suggest themselves to eliminate the current most
crying need in criminal law administration, the elimination of delay:
1. Geographic discrimination in requiring preliminary hearings and
three-judge benches, should be abolished
Under current practice in the City of New York, for offenses of the
grade of misdemeanor (other than gambling and crime under the Mul-
tiple Dwelling Law), a preliminary hearing, identical to that required
in felony cases, was mandated upon request of defendant.9 9 No such
requirement existed for local criminal courts within the fifty-seven
counties outside the city. In similar cases, a three-judge court for trial
was mandatory upon request in the case of local criminal courts inside
New York City, but not for those outside the city.20 0 At first blush, any
rational basis for this geographic distinction would normally operate
in the reverse: The volume of misdemeanor cases is so great within the
196 N.Y. CCP § 517, overruling People v. Gersewitz, 294 N.Y. 163, 61 N.E.2d 427 (1945).
197 N.Y. CPL § 450.20; see also notes 94-100 and accompanying text supra.
198 N.Y. CPL § 460.30.
'99 N.Y.C. CimM. Cr. Ace § 40 (McKinney 1963).
200 Id.
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city compared to that outside, that one would reasonably anticipate a
more expeditious and abbreviated procedure as a matter of necessity
within the city.
The justification advanced for the intra-extra municipal difference
in procedure has been that six-man jury trials were provided for the
disposition of misdemeanor cases outside the city, but not within it.201
These provisions for the geographic distinction in according preliminary
hearings and three-judge trials in misdemeanors have been continued
by the CPL.20 2
The CPL was approved by the Governor on May 20, 1970, to take
effect on September 1st of the following year. On June 29, 1970, the
Supreme Court held in Baldwin v. New York,20 3 with specific reference
to this state, that possible penalties of six months or more imprisonment
made mandatory, under the federal Constitution, trial by jury. The
bulk of misdemeanors defined by the Penal Law are of the grade Glass
A, punishable by a maximum of a year's imprisonment. With respect to
these, trial by jury is now mandatory under the federal Constitution,
whether within or outside the City of New York. The old rationale for
requiring preliminary hearings within the city, but not outside, was
that state law required jury trials outside. The basis of this distinction
has now been obliterated in the case of Class A misdemeanors. Similarly,
the three-judge requirement within the city, but not outside, has lost
even the vestige of a rational basis for Class A misdemeanors under
Baldwin. As to the relatively fewer Class B misdemeanors, punishable
by a maximum of only one-third of the penalty provided for Class A,
no sane reason can be advanced for a felony-type preliminary hearing.
The discovery advantage to defendants supposedly assured by the
preliminary hearing, is amply supplied by the brand new, federal type
discovery article in the CPL.20 4 It would be equally absurd to continue
the requirement of a three-judge panel for the four-month maximum
201 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 18; N.Y. UNnoimi Jus ca Cr. Aar § 2011 (McKinney 1963);
N.Y. UNrFoaas DIsT. Cr. ACT § 2011 (McKinney 1963); N.Y. Umroiuf Crry CT. Acr § 2011
(McKinney 1963). The old Code contained no explicit provision on preliminary hearings
or three-judge panels for misdemeanor cases in the City of New York. Both requirements
were part of the New York City Criminal Court Act at a time when local criminal court
jurisdiction was vested in a Magistrates Court and Court of Special Sessions. The pre-
liminary hearing constituted the extent (absent waiver by defendant) of the Magistrates
Court's jurisdiction in misdemeanor cases, i.e., to conduct a hearing to determine whether
the case should be held for trial in the three-judge Court of Special Sessions. When both
courts were consolidated in 1962 for disposition of cases of misdemeanor and lower grade,
the requirement of preliminary hearing became vestigial but, like the vermiform appendix
in the human anatomy, continued to survive to the frequent discomfort of many.
202 N.Y. CPL §§ 170.75, 340.40(1), (2), (3).
203 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
204 See pp. 414-16 supra.
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punishable Class B misdemeanor. Such trial is no longer available in
Class A misdemeanor cases, punishable by a maximum of one year,
when jury trial is waived. It has never been available in the case of
violations, either within or without the city. It has never been available
outside the city for Class B misdemeanors. The case for continuing the
three-judge tribunal for Class B misdemeanors within the city has,
from any view, been totally eroded by the march of events since the date
of enactment of the CPL.
Based upon arrests and summonses for misdemeanors in the City
of New York in the number of 241,043 during 1970 (an increase of 6.6
percent over 1969),205 it is fair to assume that the elimination of pre-
liminary hearings and three-judge panels will affect at least one-quarter
million cases annually beginning September 1, 1971. If this number
be multiplied by the eight times each case appears on calendars in the
Criminal Court of the City of New York, some idea of shrinking delay
may be realized by this single amendment.
2. Youthful offender cases should be processed as other criminal cases
until verdict or plea of guilty. At that time, upon a single pre-sentence
investigation, the court should determine whether judgment of convic-
tion, or adjudication as youthful offender with records sealed, ought
to be entered and treatment prescribed. Either a verdict or plea of
guilty to a Class A felony, or verdict or plea of guilty to any felony when
the offender has previously been convicted of a felony or adjudicated a
youthful offender on conduct amounting to a felony, should be disposed
of by entry of judgment of conviction
The bulk of major aggressive crime is committed by males in the
young-adult stage of life. The salutary purpose of the Youthful Offender
Law, enacted in 1942, was to divert a young person, who had committed
a crime between his sixteenth and nineteenth birthday, from a sub-
sequent criminal career, and to accomplish this by substituting for the
stigma of criminal conviction an "adjudication" as "youthful of-
fender." 208 Excluded mandatorily by statute from eligibility for the
prescribed procedure and treatment, were youths in the defined age
group who were charged with what now amounts to a Class A felony, or
charged with any felony or misdemeanor who had "previously been
convicted of a felony."' 2 7 Administration of the Youthful Offender
Law for a generation has made extremely rare any youth in the defined
205 See note 109 supra.
206 N.Y. CCP §§ 913-e-913-r; see Ludwig, Considerations Basic to Reform of Juvenile
Offender Laws, 29 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 226 (1955).
207 N.Y. CCP § 913-e.
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age group who - regardless of the crime charged - has "previously
been convicted of a felony." Prior to his sixteenth birthday, any crime
committed would amount to only juvenile delinquency. During the
brief three years of eligibility for "YO," any first felony committed,
except the Class A variety, would have resulted in all probability in
youthful offender adjudication. Under the old Code, most applications
for YO procedure and treatment were in fact discretionary with the
court.
A substantial defect of "certainty" results. One judge will deny YO
for any crime of violence, regardless of background of the defendant.
Another will grant such treatment, even for a defendant with convic-
tions of misdemeanors or prior adjudications as a youthful offender
for conduct amounting to a felony. Outside well-populated areas, a
judge - bereft of investigatory probation facilities - must deny YO,
regardless of his sympathies, even in misdemeanor cases. 208
The major defect of the old Code is the mandated multiplex
investigatory procedure by probation and other personnel that con-
tributes to virtually interminable delay in the disposition of YO cases.
First, there is a "recommendation" for the investigation itself to deter-
mine eligibility. This may be made by the grand jury, district attorney,
or the court. If the recommendation is made by the district attorney,
an investigation is actually made by his office in order that he recom-
mend that an investigation for eligibility be made by the court. If
approved by the court, a "second" investigation is made by probation
personnel. If thereafter, YO is disapproved by the court, these two
investigations will have been made in vain. If the court approves YO,
and the youthful respondent is found guilty, still a third investigation,
one to determine treatment, must be ordered by the court.
Under the old Code, the multiple investigations of eligibility prior
to determination of guilt had been defended on the grounds that a dif-
ferent procedure was required for YO's vis A vis adult offenders. This
is no longer the case. Youthful offenders subject to six months or more
of complusory treatment - a class that embraces all YO's - are
entitled to trial by jury on federal constitutional grounds.20 9 Any at-
tempt to bargain the stigma-less adjudication as youthful offender in
exchange for waiver of this jury trial has been rejected by the state's
highest court.210
208 See, e.g., Zivin v. Nassau County District Court, 19 Misc. 2d 21, 23, 186 N.Y.S.2d
110, 113 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1959).
209 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
210 People v. A.C., 27 N.Y.2d 79, 261 N.E.2d 620, 313 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1970).
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The universal practice is to commingle the prescribed trial in
camera before a judge with the processing of cases involving older
offenders in open court. Under these circumstances, it seems clear that
a new simplified procedure should be adopted. The central feature
should be a single investigation by probation after determination of
guilt to determine (1) whether or not the defendant should be con-
victed or adjudicated a youthful offender; and (2) the sort of treatment
to be prescribed. The CPL falls far short of this goal.211
3. To prevent dilatory tactics, definitive time limitations should be
prescribed for the making of the omnibus motions addressed to the
indictment or information, made to suppress evidence, or to vacate
judgment or set aside sentence
Some limitations are fixed by the CPL on motions. Those addressed
to indictment or information "should be made prior to entry of a plea
of guilty or commencement of trial," but "the court, in the interest of
justice and for good cause shown, may, in its discretion, entertain and
dispose of the motion on the merits at any time before sentence.2 12
The motions to suppress evidence "must be made with reasonable
diligence prior to trial" but "may be made for the first time during
trial" under certain circumstances. 213 The motion to set aside a verdict
contains no reference to any time limitations. 14 The post-judgment
motions may be made, "[a]t any time after the entry of a judgment."21 5
These limitations and non-limitations contained in the CPL are
conducive to drawn-out motion practice and delay of ultimate disposi-
tion. There is no cogent reason why definitive limitations, such as ten
or twenty days ought not to be spelled out in the CPL as it is in the
CPLR. The current cunctatory system of criminal law administration
must either be speeded up or the whole system given up.
4. Hearsay evidence in the form of medical examiners reports, should
be made both competent and admissible before the grand jury
Reference has been made to the "albeit giant step" of the CPL
towards federal practice under virtually identical wording of state and
federal constitutional mandates of indictment by grand jury. The CPL
has liberalized the restrictions of the old Code on hearsay reports con-
cerning examinations, comparisons and tests of a scientific or profes-
211 N.Y. CPL art. 720.
212 Id. § 210.20(2) (emphasis added).
213 Id. § 710.40(1), (2).
214 Id. § 330.30, 330.40.
215 Id. § 440.10(1).
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sional nature.216 The language, on its face, would apparently embrace
the reports of physicians, chemists, physicists and biologists employed
by the Medical Examiner in the City of New York. However, there is
some legislative history indicating that this is not the case. Because of
the current huge number of homicides and the massive roadblock to
indictments caused by the personal unavailability of physicians, chem-
ists, physicists, biologists and other scientists participating in the autopsy
of the victim, nothing can be lost by making explicit that the official
reports of these officials be made competent before the grand jury.
5. Three different expediting devices for felony cases, viz., (a) unitary
preliminary processing in a single court of superior jurisdiction; (b)
alternative accusation by information instead of indictment, and (c)
requirement of permission to appeal - all necessitating state constitu-
tional amendment - ought to be explored
In the current crisis caused by the clogging of judicial machinery
designed to process serious criminal cases, more drastic reforms than
those authorized by the draftsmen of the CPL ought to be considered:
(a) The feasibility of having the superior criminal court handle all fel-
ony cases from their inception. Whether or not this necessitates the
consolidation of the Criminal Term of the Supreme Court within the
City of New York with the Criminal Court, as proposed by the dean of
New York prosecutors,2 11 the procedure is embraced by the federal dis-
trict courts. From the viewpoint of judicial administration, the plan is
sound. The felony jurisdiction of the Criminal Court is subject to a
city-wide Supreme Court Justice who administers the system, under the
guidance and approval of the presiding Justices of the Appellate Divi-
sions of two separate judicial departments, one of them embracing the
problems of seven counties outside the City of New York as well; (b)
The alternative procedure of information by the prosecutor, instead of
indictment by grand jury, is permissible in federal and many state
courts under the virtually identical wording of the right to indictment
by grand jury contained in the state Constitution, so long as the defen-
dant waives indictment. A decision by the state's highest court holds
that waiver is insufficient and a constitutional amendment is necessary
to make this procedure valid;218 (c) Automatic appeal, as a matter of
right, while in no way hampering a speedy disposition in the trial court,
certainly contributes to delay in disposition of criminal matters. For
216 See notes 152-53 and accompanying text supra.
217 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 22, 1971, at 1, col. 5 (remarks of Mr. Hogan).
218 People ex rel. Wachowicz v. Martin, 293 N.Y. 361, 57 NXE.2d 53 (194).
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the sake of saving our own state from embarrassment, we choose a com-
parable jurisdiction, California, in which cases as serious as murder are
subject to retrial as many as five times over a period of ten years.219
Collateral attacks on a judgment of conviction by writs of error coram
nobis may, by statute, without constitutional amendment, be made
appealable only upon permission of an appellate court judge. It should
be noted that not only is the right to appeal not one under the due pro-
cess clause of the federal Constitution -but also that the entire ap-
pellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States, enacted
by Congress, depends upon the discretion of four of the nine Justices
to make review possible. Certain provisions of the state Constitution
freezing existing jurisdiction to review makes extension of the doctrine
of permissible review a matter of constitutional amendment. One huge
advantage of requiring appellate court permission for review would
enable those courts to concentrate on meritorious appeals, instead of
mandatorily scattering their attention to all sorts of pencil-written
petitions from the penitentiary, 97 percent of which are palpably with-
out merit.
6. A statute, definitive in terms of months and specifying circum-
stances under which it may be tolled, should measure the period of per-
missible pendency of a criminal action
"After a criminal action is commenced, the defendant is entitled
to a speedy trial," 220 is the sole rule on delay contained in the CPL. The
few specific time standards are concerned solely with jail cases: (a) In
the absence of defendant's consent to prosecution under a misdemeanor
complaint or compelling circumstances, five days is the limit of confine-
ment without filing an information; 221 (b) Under the same conditions,
seventy-two hours is the limit of confinement under a felony complaint
in the absence of hearing or indictment;222 (c) Under similar conditions,
forty-five days is the limit for a criminal court to hold a defendant in
custody pending grand jury action.223
219 People v. Terry, 70 A.C. 427 (1969) (1960 murder, fifth trial pending in 1969);
see also People v. Modesto, 66 Cal. 2d 695, 427 P.2d 788, 59 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1969)
(multiple murders in 1961, three judgments of conviction affirmed by the state's highest
court, hearing pending in federal district court in 1969); In re Hillary, 71 A.C. 896 (1969)
(1962 murder, third trial pending in 1969); In re Seiterle, 71 A.C. 722 (1969) (multiple
murders in 1960, fourth trial pending in 1969); People v. Ketchel, 71 A.C. 651 (1969)
(1961 murder, fourth trial pending in 1969); In re Arguello, 71 A.C. 13 (1969) (1961 murder,
fourth trial pending in 1969); see generally Fleming, Court Survival in the Litigation
Explosion, 54 J. Ams. JuD. Soc'Y 109, 113 (1970).
220 N.Y. CPL § 80.20; cf. N.Y. CCP § 8(1).
221 N.Y. CPL § 170.70.
222 Id.
223 Id. § 190.80.
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The demand for speedy trial in the state courts has recently been
made a federal constitutional mandate.22 To translate that demand
into a period between accusation and disposition measured definitively
in numbers of either terms of court, months or days is the project of the
legislature by statute or the courts by rule. The old Code attempted
this measure by terms of court, allowing one term between being "held
to answer" and indictment,225 and another between indictment and
trial.226 In both cases, the sanction was dismissal of the charge, was dis-
cretionary with the court and was subject to "good cause shown."
Those states that define speedy trial in terms of days, fix the period
from seventy-five days to six months.227 Some statutes and rules exhaus-
tively enumerate excuses for delay.228 Most delay is occasioned by de-
fendants who feel they have nothing to gain from trial and everything
to expect by delay in exhaustion of victims, complainants and witnesses.
A realistic rule would embrace not only a period of time defined by
months and a full list of excuses, but also requirements of periodic re-
ports to judicial conferences from judges granting adjournments and
sanctions of remand for cunctative defendants.
Convicting the Guilty
Two major obstacles to successful prosecution of organized crime
and official corruption in state tribunals are the statutory rule of cor-
roboration of accomplice testimony and the constitutional problem of
immunity and self-incrimination before the grand jury.
7. The statutory requirement of corroboration for accomplice testi-
mony should be abolished and a rule requiring cautionary instruction
to the jury adopted instead
In 1987, a commission on criminal justice branded the New York
statutory "corroborated accomplice" rule a refuge of organized crime
and recommended its repeal. 22 9 Thirty-four years later, in the teeth of
an enormous resurgence of organized crime and official corruption, the
CPL has not only reaffirmed this rule that sharply departs both from the
common law and the practice in the federal courts and most states, but
224 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
225 N.Y. CCP § 667.
226Id. § 668; see also id. §§ 669-a, 669-b.
227 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West 1964) (fifteen days from date held to answer
to information; sixty days from filing information to trial); PA. STAT. tit. 19, § 781 (1964)
(six months from commitment).
228 E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-191 (1960); 2D CIR. R. (Jan. 5, 1971).
229 1937 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 77.
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also has enlarged this barrier to convicting the guilty by expanding the
class of witnesses who may be deemed accomplices. 280
In its ancient form, the common-law rule that prevailed in England
and the United States well into the nineteenth century, an accomplice
who confessed and named his accessories was deemed an "approver."
He was required to abjure the realm and on his failure was hanged on
his confession. The departure from the common law contained in the
old Code2 31 is based on inherent suspicion generally of testimony pos-
sibly motivated by self-interest. Under varying circumstances in both
civil and criminal cases, a witness may have motives of self-interest in
giving testimony. Adversary counsel has full opportunity to explore
these motives on cross-examination because they bear on the veracity of
the witness, i.e., that he is relating his actual present recollection of past
events, and nothing else. Veracity is only one of the ingredients of
credibility, and credibility is always a question for the triers of fact.282
Legislative intervention in the accomplice and other situations,2 18 is in
the form of a rule of thumb that numbers of witnesses can make up a
deficit in credible testimony. If a witness is fully credible in all respects,
no corroboration is necessary; if he is not, no number of corroborators
can supply the deficiency. This legislative solution to the trial and
grand jury issue of witness credibility simply relieves the sitting judge
of examining all of the evidence on a motion to dismiss and restrict his
inquiry to the artificial question of whether or not there is another wit-
ness.
Under the old Code, a witness was an accomplice if he could have
been convicted at common law either as principal or accessory before
the fact, or when he wrongfully participated in the commission of the
crime although he could not have been convicted of its commission.234
Under the old Code, for purposes of prosecution official corruption and
organized crime, both the bribe giver and receiver have been deemed
accomplices, thus making indictment and conviction in such cases
formidable for the prosecution. 2 5 For other crimes, the courts have
230 N.Y. CPL § 60.22.
231 N.Y. CCP § 399.
232 Other ingredients are, of course, capacity and opportunity to observe, memory
and ability to relate. See Ludwig, The Case For Repeal of the Sex Corroboration Re-
quirement in New York, 36 BRooKLYN L. REv. 378 (1970).
233 See note 15 supra.
234 People v. Clougher, 246 N.Y. 106, 158 N.E. 38 (1927); People v. Sweeney, 213
N.Y. 37, 106 N.E. 913 (1914); People v. Gondelman, 253 App. Div. 924, 2 N.Y.S.2d 405
(2d Dep't 1938). At common law, a thief was deemed an accomplice if he induced the
defendant to become his receiver. State v. Coroles, 74 Utah 94, 277 P. 203 (1929). But by
statute in New York, the thief was not deemed an accomplice in such a situation.
Old N.Y. Penal Law § 1308-a.
285 See People v. Mfullens, 292 N.Y. 408, 414, 55 N.E.2d 479, 481 (1944).
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wrestled with the problem whether the witness should be characterized
as accomplice, victim, mere witness or spectator and have come up with
considerably conflicting results. The CPL, in continuing the accomplice
rule, undertakes an expansive definition by statute of an accomplice for
the first time. Under this definition, there is no requirement that the
witness be subject to conviction but merely that he possessed the requi-
site state of mind for commission of the offense and in some way "en-
gaged" in its commission.230
The rational rule employed in the federal courts is to make such
testimony of an accomplice admissible and leave to the trier of fact the
question of witness credibility, together with a cautionary instruction
which is "never an absolute necessity" though "deemed usually de-
sirable. '237 A state statute making admissible accomplice testimony and
mandating a cautionary instruction - though still a stricter rule than
the federal one - -would be far more preferable than the present pro-
vision of the CPL.
8. Witness immunity before the grand jury
The effect of compelling the testimony before a grand jury of a
witness who participated in a criminal transaction has always been a
difficult one to assess under the state constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination23 8 and state statutes conferring immunity.23 9 The
difficulty has not been diminished by the recent occupation of the field
by the federal guarantee in the fifth amendment, subjecting the ques-
tion to reappraisal in the light of determinations by the Supreme
Court.240
Our focus here is limited to compelling the testimony (1) of wit-
nesses who are targets of an investigation, actual or prospective defen-
dants or tainted and more or less accomplices in a criminal transaction;
(2) before a grand jury, and not a court, civil or criminal, or civil ad-
ministrative body; and (3) in an investigation not merely of conspiracy,
bribery or gambling, but of any crime. Excluded from this focus is, of
course, the witness - of whatever status as to involvement - who exe-
cutes a waiver of immunity; and the witness - of whatever status as to
involvement and manner of appearance - who, seeking an immunity
bath, blurts out incriminating answers when no incriminating ques-
tions are asked.
There has always been two kinds of immunity in state proceedings:
236 N.Y. CPL § 60.22(3).
237 United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2d Cir. 1933).
238 N.Y. CONSr. art. 1, § 6.
239 Old N.Y. Penal Law § 2447 (now N.Y.CCP § 619-c).
2 40 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US. 1 (1964).
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constitutional under the self-incrimination clause of the state Constitu-
tion (and, since 1964, under the fifth amendment of the federal Consti-
tution); and statutory, under which the state legislature confers amnesty
for testimony given by the witness, and the only question for the courts
is whether the immunity conferred is as broad as any incriminating
answer given.
Prior to current proposals of the CPL, there were two eras of case
law on the effect of compelling testimony before a grand jury: first, the
automatic era when witnesses who appeared under compulsion need
not have claimed any privilege or have immunity conferred upon them.
They received immunity for incriminating evidence by dint of being
subpoenaed. This was the case even though immunity statutes scat-
tered through the Penal Law were operative.241 Second, the statutory
formality era, which began in 1953 with the adoption of a statute that
required, before the witness obtain immunity, that he be asked a ques-
tion, that he refuse to answer, that he claim his privilege, that the grand
jury retire, deliberate, return and confer immunity, and that the wit-
ness thereafter answer the question. In a subsequent criminal prosecu-
tion based upon that answer, immunity to some undefined extent was
recognized.242 The formality was first suggested by the Law Revision
Commission in 1942 out of fear that under multitudinous immunity
statutes governing purely civil matters, through connivance a minor ad-
ministrative official might give an immunity bath to a witness who also
happened to be a flagitious criminal.2 43 The suggestion was picked up
by a report of the State Crime Commission a decade later,244 and with
the support of that body, became law.
The trouble with the formality statute was that the courts chose
to ignore it in the case of witnesses of the suspect, tainted, target and
prospective defendant genre who blatantly testified without refusing
to answer and claim privilege, or who refused to answer, or who lied.
For this less creditable class of witness, the courts have held (on purely
constitutional grounds) that this type of witness should not have been
called in the first place; if this type witness gives evidence without
claiming privilege, the evidence cannot be used against him; if the
penumbral witness lies, he cannot be prosecuted for perjury; and, fi-
nally, if he is contumacious and refuses to answer, he cannot be prose-
cuted for contempt.2 45
On the other hand, under the formality statute, the pedestrian
241 People v. Sharp, 107 N.Y. 427, 445-46, 14 N.E. 319, 336-38 (1887).
242 Old N.Y. Penal Law § 2447 (now N.Y. CCP § 619-c).
243 1942 N.Y. LG. Doc. No. 12, at 17-18.
244 3D REP., N.Y.S. CRME CoaISSION 15 (1953).
245 People v. Yonkers Contracting Co., 17 N.Y.2d 822, 217 N.E.2d 829, 270 N.Y.S.2d
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citizen called as a witness before the grand jury waives his immunity if
he does not claim it, and is subject to punishment for perjury or con-
tempt if he lies or refuses to answer. So, far from preventing the im-
munity bath for flagitious criminals, the formality statute has had the
effect of giving him the keys to the city in the grand-jury room, while
imposing upon the law-abiding spectator all of the sanctions, if he does
not affirmatively assert his privileges and gives incriminating answers,
or false ones, or is evasive.
The CPL, in returning to the automatic era and repealing the
formalities statute in the grand jury, has eradicated the preferred status
of tainted witnesses vis4-vis ordinary ones. This is entirely salutary and
one of the crowning achievements of this new body of law. A lingering
quarrel remains solely with respect to the extent of immunity auto-
matically granted for incriminating answers. The CPL extends immu-
nity beyond testimony actually given to "any transaction, matter or
thing concerning which he gave evidence," - in short, so-called trans-
actional immunity.2 46 But the highest court of the state has repeatedly
indicated that automatic grants of immunity based upon the Constitu-
tion extend only to testimony actually given - testimonial immu-
nity.247 This means that the testimony given by the witness cannot
subsequently be used against him either in a grand jury or at trial, but
that he may be accused (albeit by a different grand jury from the one
before which he testified) of an offense arising out of the transaction
concerning which he gave evidence. In the area of prosecuting organized
crime, no reason can sanely be advanced why the legislature should be
more charitable in granting immunity than the highest court of the
state finds requisite under the demands of the federal and state constitu-
tions in order to compel testimony.
Acquitting the Innocent
Two further considerations, particularly affecting defendants and
the certainty and uniformity of disposition of their cases have been
seriously overlooked by the CPL.
9. Definitive provisions governing negotiated pleas of guilty must be
set forth
Of 12,855 indictments for felony disposed of in the City of New
York during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, only 559, or 4.3 per-
745 (1966); People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 176 N.E.2d 571, 218 N.YS.2d 647 (1961);
People v. Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d 214, 160 N.E.2d 468, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959); People v.
DeFeo, 308 N.Y. 595, 127 N.E.2d 592 (1955).
246 N.Y. CPL § 50.10(1).
247 People v. LaBello, 24 N.Y.2d 598, 249 N.E.2d 412, 301 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1969); People
v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 176 N.E.2d 571, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1961).
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cent, were verdict after trial, and 12,296, or 95.7 percent, were by plea
of guilty to either felony or misdemeanor, negotiated before or during
trial.245 Clearly, the Perry Mason characterization of a criminal prosecu-
tion as a courtroom confrontation between two lawyers in antagonistic
roles is a popular misconception. Barely one in ten accused of a major
crime in the United States ever reaches court for trial.249 Yet the CPL
dedicates to this paramount method of disposition only a single sub-
division of one five-subdivision section in a law containing more than
400 sections.4 0 Recently, the Supreme Court, as a matter of due process,
has made applicable to state acceptance of guilty pleas virtually the
identical rigorous and explicit standards laid down for their acceptance
in federal courts 251 The President's Commission on Law Enforcement
devoted five columns in two pages, endorsing the practice and making
three recommendations. 252 The American Bar Association's Project on
Minimum Standards sets forth fourteen canons regulating this pro-
cedure.253 The total omission of any rules governing the disposition
of the overwhelming number of major criminal cases is a glaring hiatus
in the CPL.
Moreover, for purposes of disposition by plea, the CPL has adopted
the test of "lesser included offenses" used for trial purposes,25 with an
expansion for pleas that frankly is not sufficiently expansive and ex-
cludes the traditional hypothetical plea.255
10. Provision should be made for transfer from municipal to state
facilities of prisoners convicted of felonies and awaiting sentencing
A major cause of the municipal prison riots in October 1970 was
overcrowding. A major cause of overcrowding is the significant number
of prisoners - more than one-third - whose cases have long since been
disposed of by plea of guilty or verdict, but who are awaiting sen-
tence.250 The principal reason for non-sentence is that the judge is
awaiting a pre-sentence report. Although in practice sentences have
248 See REPORT, supra note 142.
249 See Mackell, Streamlining Procedure for Guilty Pleas, 4 THE PROSECUTroR 75 (1968).
250 N.Y. CPL § 220.10(5); cf. N.Y. CCP § 342-a.
251 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 283
(1969); see FED. R. Cail. P. 11.
252 R.r'ouR OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JusnTcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY 134-37 (1967).
253 ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY (Approved Draft 1968).
254 N.Y. CPL § 1.20(87).
255 Id. § 220.20; cf. People v. Moyer, 27 N.Y.2d 252, 265 N.E2d 535, 317 N.Y.S.2d 9
(1970).
256 See Mackell, Sentencing of Prisoner Without Probation Report Is a Valid
Procedure, N.Y.LJ., Oct. 21, 1970, at 1, col. 3.
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almost never been pronounced until such reports had been received,
as a matter of law sentencing without receipt of these reports by state
courts has been uniformly upheld.257 The CPL makes the pre-sentence
report a sine qua non, and moreover does so - unlike provisions of the
old Code - for misdemeanor sentences in excess of ninety days, as well
as for any felony conviction.2 58 There can be no quarrel with an inves-
tigation of an offender's background to determine optimum treatment,
nor even a lengthy in-depth study for this purpose. The problem simply
is one of situs of the subject while he is bing studied. If he remains-
as he now does - in municipal detention facilities, another log-jam
of even more horrendous proportions may be expected as soon as the
CPL takes effect. If provision is made for his transfer to a more com-
modious state facility upon his conviction and while awaiting sentence,
the common good will be advanced by preventing conditions conducive
to unrest, disorder and riot in municipal prisons.
257 United States ex rel. Brown v. City of New York, 240 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
United States ex rel. Boone v. Fay, 231 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); People ex rel.
Thompson v. Noble, 231 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
258 N.Y. CPL § 390.20.
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